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Moral Restorative Justice: A Political 
Genealogy of Activism and Neoliberalism 
in the United States 
Amy J. Cohen† 
  INTRODUCTION 
Today, it is common to describe a “bipartisan consensus” on 
the American criminal justice system.1 Policymakers “across the 
aisle” agree that particular rules and institutions, such as ab-
stract adjudication and determinate sentencing, should change 
as they confront a crisis of incarcerated people who are not re-
formed by their encounters with the system.2 A critical literature 
unpacks this consensus by distinguishing its “left” and “right” 
articulations. Reformers on the political left, critical criminal 
law scholars argue, theorize social and environmental causes of 
crime and propose remedies motivated to address the racial, 
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 1. See, e.g., Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: New Approaches to a 
Growing Problem, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529, 534 (2012). Podgor puts 
the point dramatically: “Perhaps what has been the most impressive aspect of 
this movement [to stop overcriminalization] is that it has no political or ideolog-
ical colors. Its voice comes from the left, the right, Democrats, Republicans . . . .” 
Id. 
 2. A recent, if incremental, example: in December 2018, a large majority 
of the Senate voted to relax some federal mandatory minimum sentencing laws 
and enable some federal prisoners to earn earlier release. First Step Act of 2018, 
S. 756, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted). 
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class-based, and gendered inequalities and violence perpetuated 
by the penal system.3 By contrast, reformers on the political 
right are seen primarily as advancing economic rationalities en-
capsulated in the term “neoliberalism”: cost-benefit analysis, 
public choice theory, and managerial and actuarial logics applied 
to social problems—what Allegra McLeod calls “neoliberal penal 
reform” and describes as “decarceration as a component of a re-
gressive fiscal program”;4 or what Hadar Aviram calls “fiscal 
prudence rather than humanitarian concern” and argues stands 
to retrench a “neoliberal framework.”5 Summarizing such anal-
yses, Benjamin Levin describes the (radical) left as offering “ide-
ological critique of neoliberalism,” including how the criminal 
justice system reflects structural inequalities, whereas the cen-
ter and right care mostly about using resources efficiently—
“right sizing” the penal system so that public costs are calibrated 
more precisely to public goods.6  
These arguments hold important explanatory power—they 
illustrate how this present moment of so-called bipartisan re-
form may in practice conserve rather than transform existing 
systems. This Article, however, asks: how is this analysis of cen-
trist and right-wing economic motivations incomplete? By de-
scribing mainstream penal reform as a series of rational calcu-
lations, left analysts stand to miss how economic and moral 
logics are often deeply intertwined. Or to put this inquiry an-
 
 3. See Benjamin Levin, The Consensus Myth in Criminal Justice Reform, 
117 MICH. L. REV. 259, 272–73 (2018).  
 4. Allegra M. McLeod, Beyond the Carceral State, 95 TEX. L. REV. 651, 656 
(2017). 
 5. HADAR AVIRAM, CHEAP ON CRIME: RECESSION-ERA POLITICS AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN PUNISHMENT 58, 98 (2015). This neoliberal 
framework, Aviram explains, includes “the retreat of the state from its caretak-
ing function, the despair of rehabilitative goals, and the focus on profitable and 
managerial goals.” Id. at 98. For other critiques of the bipartisan consensus and 
specifically its focus on fiscal concerns, see generally MARIE GOTTSCHALK, 
CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS 
(2015); Katherine Beckett, Anna Reosti & Emily Knaphus, The End of an Era? 
Understanding the Contradictions of Criminal Justice Reform, 664 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 238, 250 (2016); Marie Gottschalk, Bring It On: The 
Future of Penal Reform, the Carceral State, and American Politics, 12 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 559 (2015); and Carl Takei, From Mass Incarceration to Mass Con-
trol, and Back Again: How Bipartisan Criminal Justice Reform May Lead to a 
For-Profit Nightmare, 20 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 125 (2017). 
 6. Levin, supra note 3, at 273. 
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other way, if, as critical scholars argue, bipartisan criminal jus-
tice reform is constrained by limited forms of public redistribu-
tion and little structural transformation—that is, if bipartisan 
reform is “still neoliberal”—then this Article suggests we should 
investigate American neoliberalism not simply for its economic 
but also for its moral character. 
To illustrate some of the moral logics animating penal re-
form, this Article pursues a genealogy of restorative justice—a 
decarceral strategy that today elicits support across the aisle. 
Restorative justice is a mediative process that invites offenders 
to directly experience the effects of their crime through conver-
sations with victims (as well as through conversations with fam-
ily and community members convened into “conferences” or “cir-
cles”), and then to deliberate about how to repair such effects 
through emotional, spiritual, and material reparations.7 It orig-
inated (in its contemporary form) in the last decades of the twen-
tieth century primarily (but never exclusively) on the political 
left. But in the United States it has only ever limped along at the 
margins of the criminal justice system. This is because its found-
 
 7. In this Article, I describe restorative justice as a mediative process, alt-
hough I recognize that restorative justice differs from classic forms of civil me-
diation. Significantly, in most restorative processes an offender must concede 
the alleged harm as a precondition to dialogue with a victim. Some restorative 
processes, however, “allow for acceptance of responsibility to emerge” through a 
continuing set of facilitated conversations “rather than requir[e] [responsibility] 
to be established at the outset.” Barbara Hudson, Restorative Justice and Gen-
dered Violence: Diversion or Effective Justice?, 42 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 616, 
625 (2002). As such, restorative processes vary in how much mediation, dispute 
resolution, and consensual agreement they incorporate. For example, partici-
pants engaged in a violent conflict may themselves attempt to reach a consensus 
about what harm occurred. Or, more commonly, the fact of harm is stipulated, 
and an offender and victim may instead attempt to reach a consensus about 
what sort of restitution the offender should offer to meet the victim’s needs. Or 
harm is stipulated, and a victim along with community members and criminal 
justice professionals may deliberate about restitution and jointly reach a deci-
sion that an offender may accept. For an argument to expand the range of cases 
where restorative justice looks more like mediation (that is, a process where 
parties can “discuss the facts of the case, relative culpability, and a range of 
outcomes”), see M. Eve Hanan, Decriminalizing Violence: A Critique of Restor-
ative Justice and Proposal for Diversionary Mediation, 46 N.M. L. Rev. 123, 155 
(2016). 
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ing theorists and practitioners rejected, as far as they could, ei-
ther a rational or pathologized penal subject.8 Restorativists in-
stead willed a different human into being: what John 
Braithwaite calls a “virtuous actor”9—that is, a moral agent who 
has lost her way, often in the face of excessive individualism and 
social disintegration, yet who may re-biography herself as an ac-
countable, redeemable subject especially when reintegrated into 
“communities of care.”10 For this reason, restorativists often ar-
gue that deterrent strategies (which presume a rational actor) 
and incapacitative strategies (which presume a pathological ac-
tor) should be the exception, not the rule.11 Restorativists would 
instead institutionalize strong disciplinary forms of informal so-
cial control designed to inspire ethical feeling and moral account-
ability, which in turn requires keeping offenders, as far as pos-
sible, “in communities.” This is why restorative justice is 
potentially significantly decarceral. 
In the United States today, restorative justice is gaining 
supporters on the political right, including among Republican 
policymakers, evangelical conservative Christians, and libertar-
ian organizations funded by the Charles Koch Foundation.12 As 
 
 8. See, e.g., JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A RE-
MARKABLE COURT DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF PRISONS IN AMERICA 23 (2014) 
(describing the late twentieth century “common sense” understanding of crimi-
nals that fueled mass incarceration: that “most criminals have a high and un-
changing potential for criminal activity, including violence”).  
 9. John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessi-
mistic Accounts, 25 CRIME & JUST. 1, 61 (1999).  
 10. John Braithwaite & Kathleen Daly, Masculinities, Violence and Com-
munitarian Control, in JUST BOYS DOING BUSINESS?: MEN, MASCULINITIES, 
AND CRIME 189, 201 (Tim Newburn & Elizabeth A. Stanko eds., 1994).  
 11. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGU-
LATION 42 (2002); Braithwaite, supra note 9, at 60–67; see also RON CLAASSEN, 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE - FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 2 (1996) (“Restorative Jus-
tice prefers that offenders who pose significant safety risks and are not yet co-
operative be placed in settings where the emphasis is on safety, values, ethics, 
responsibility, accountability, and civility. They should be exposed to the impact 
of their crime(s) on victims, invited to learn empathy, and offered learning op-
portunities to become better equipped with skills to be a productive member of 
society. They should continually be invited (not coerced) to become cooperative 
with the community and be given the opportunity to demonstrate this in appro-
priate settings as soon as possible.”); HOWARD ZEHR, CHANGING LENSES: A NEW 
FOCUS FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE 221 (1990) (“What do we do with the ‘dangerous 
few’? Do we incarcerate?”). 
 12. See infra Part III. 
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an uptick in legislation suggests, restorative justice is also in-
creasingly promoted from within state institutions. For example, 
between 2010 and 2015, fifteen states enacted or updated restor-
ative justice statutes13—lawmaking that Shannon Sliva argues 
cannot be predicted by political party affiliation.14 Of course, and 
notwithstanding this activity, there is no such thing as biparti-
san restorative justice. Restorativists on the left and right have 
very different views about, for example, the mediation of violent 
versus nonviolent crime, state versus community control over 
mediative processes, and the relationship between individual 
harm and structural change.15 But in all versions of restorative 
justice—and driving its institutionalization—proponents agree 
that crime is often foundationally an interpersonal harm that 
requires intensely personalized and relational processes in re-
sponse. As such, this Article also asks: why is restorative jus-
tice’s ethic of relationality mainstreaming now?  
The answer is complex. Over the last several decades, policy 
elites have combined an economistic approach to crime control 
with a particular moral strategy: legitimating sovereign power 
through populist punitivity, costs be damned.16 Today, however, 
the American penal state is confronting the limits of “harsh jus-
tice.”17 Rather than double down on the moral righteousness of 
punishment or retreat to post-war rehabilitative and welfarist 
penal policies, restorative justice potentially enables something 
different. It invites policymakers to institutionalize spaces of 
ethical feeling and action where offenders can experience per-
sonal transformations through values such as responsibility, for-
giveness, and grace. Restorative justice appeals today across the 
 
 13. SHANNON M. SLIVA, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE LEGISLATIVE TRENDS, 
https://www.rjcolorado.org/_literature_153668/Restorative_Justice_ 
Legislation_Trends [https://perma.cc/PN6V-WBJF].  
 14. Shannon M. Sliva, Finally “Changing Lenses”? State-Level Determi-
nants of Restorative Justice Laws, 98 PRISON J. 519, 535 (2018) (“The hypothesis 
that a higher percentage of Democratic [compared to Republican] legislators 
would be associated with more supportive restorative justice legislation was re-
jected.”). 
 15. Many left restorativists describe struggles for restorative justice and 
struggles for structural transformations as advancing the same overarching so-
cial and political ends. See infra notes 165–70, 292–304 and accompanying text. 
 16. See DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL 
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 131–35 (2001).  
 17. See generally JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE: CRIMINAL PUNISH-
MENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE (2003).  
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aisle, I will thus argue, because it offers a distinctively moral 
form of neoliberalism.18 It offers a way of living under late capi-
talist conditions that is not competitive or self-interested, but in-
tensely solicitous and caring, and caring not just for the self but 
especially for others: offenders, victims, families, community 
members, mediators, prosecutors, social workers are all sup-
posed to restore interpersonal relationships and—through these 
relationships—produce new (or old) forms of social cohesion nec-
essary to scale back the penal and the social state.19 Or to put 
this argument another way, today libertarian reformers increas-
ingly claim that skepticism of state intervention in social welfare 
systems and in penal corrections should be mutually reinforcing 
political commitments.20 Such reformers, however, know well 
that accomplishing effective community self-regulation requires 
a private sphere saturated with moral-relational values, not 
simply rational atomized individualism.  
This Article begins by elaborating the terms “restorative jus-
tice” and “neoliberalism” conceptually to trace points of conver-
gence and divergence between them. Part II unpacks the devel-
opment of restorative justice in the United States genealogically, 
starting in the 1970s with its modern institutional roots in the 
community mediation movement and its attack on centralized, 
expert state adjudication. In the 1980s and 1990s, as civil medi-
ation morphed from community empowerment into market-
managerial practices, early restorativists infused criminal medi-
ation with an intrinsically moral-relational dimension. They set 
relationality against retributive, rehabilitative, and deterrence-
based theories of incarceration, which influential restorative 
theorists also tethered to left-progressive efforts to challenge sta-
tus quo social and economic inequalities. This moral-relational 
dimension made restorative justice far more marginal than civil 
 
 18. I borrow this term (and a heuristic distinction between “market neolib-
eralism” and “moral neoliberalism”) from ANDREA MUEHLEBACH, THE MORAL 
NEOLIBERAL: WELFARE AND CITIZENSHIP IN ITALY 19–20 (2012). 
 19. See id. at 6–7. 
 20. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan & Carl Hulse, Republicans and Democrats Can-
not Agree on Absolutely Anything. Except This., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/us/prison-reform-bill-republicans 
-democrats.html [https://perma.cc/N768-2UUP] (describing the views of Marc 
Levin who spearheaded criminal justice programming as part of the libertarian 
Texas Public Policy Foundation and co-founded the think tank Right on Crime). 
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mediation in American judicial institutions, but it also made re-
storative justice available for new translations.  
Part III examines these translations. Around the millen-
nium, a number of criminal law scholars proposed fusing resto-
ration with retributivism so that practices of apology and for-
giveness could temper rather than decenter traditional 
punishment theories. Important Christian conservatives evolved 
their own version of retributive-restorative justice consistent 
with political commitments to small government, voluntary care, 
and personal transformation against sin. As the crisis of mass 
incarceration chipped away at American faith in penal harsh-
ness, these reformist ideas became broadly available for biparti-
san policy uptake—influencing, for example, efforts to enact 
statewide victim-offender mediation in Texas that yoke argu-
ments for healing and relationality together with arguments for 
cost-cutting and a smaller social state.  
This Article thus offers a cautionary tale about American 
restorative justice consistent with arguments that doubt today’s 
bipartisan consensus. It also, however, complicates left criti-
cisms of that bipartisan consensus. When left scholars set hu-
manitarian concerns against efficiency, particular arguments 
follow: often we criticize economic logics and debate strategic 
partnerships with clear expectations about the limits of fiscally 
oriented reform. By contrast, this Article illustrates how a re-
form agenda characterized by repeated arguments about fiscal 
prudence may at times rely deeply on moral-relational ideals—
ideals that do not necessarily contradict but for some may in-
stead advance political commitments to shrinking state care and 
public provisioning. As such, restorative justice invites political 
rivals to support values such as relationality and mutual aid 
that they may genuinely share—at the same time as these values 
may be ruthlessly competing for very different overarching nor-
mative political, economic, and social visions.  
I.  RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND NEOLIBERALISM: A 
CONCEPTUAL SKETCH   
In the United States, modern restorative principles origi-
nated in experiments in informal justice in the 1970s, which 
shared ideas in common with a broader attack on the criminal 
justice system—ideas that in the 1980s paradoxically helped to 
consolidate the harsh penal regime that Americans have today. 
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For example, early restorativists expressed skepticism about 
professional state-administered treatment and rehabilitation. 
Instead, they commended governing through community and de-
volving responsibility from state to private actors to manage 
questions of crime and justice. In this Part, I lay out basic restor-
ative principles—subsidiarity, active responsibilization, and an 
ethic of relationality—as they were articulated by founding 
scholars working in multiple national contexts. To make sense 
of potential synergies between restorative justice and neoliber-
alism, I then offer a perspective on neoliberalism that does not 
reduce primarily to a set of coherent arguments about rational 
economics. 
A. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 
Subsidiarity first.21 In 1977, Norwegian criminologist Nils 
Christie published a still-foundational essay, Conflicts as Prop-
erty.22 Christie argued that advanced industrialized states de-
prive citizens of a critical resource—conflicts—which citizens 
rightfully “own” and should be entitled to use to elaborate their 
own norms and social relationships.23 To that end, Christie ex-
tensively criticized professional, statist forms of expertise and 
called instead for “lay-oriented” courts that would stage in-
tensely personalized encounters between victims and offend-
ers.24  
 
 21. I use the term subsidiarity here not simply to suggest decentralization 
but also to capture some of its meaning as a moral principle rooted in Catholic 
social thought, namely, that people should balance personal responsibility and 
dignity with the common good through plural social processes, associations, and 
forms—and that government should therefore take care not to replace the ends 
of individuals and smaller associations. For an extensive explication, see Joseph 
Drew & Bligh Grant, Subsidiarity: More than a Principle of Decentralization—
A View from Local Government, 47 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 552 (2017). See also 
Yishai Blank, Federalism, Subsidiarity, and the Role of Local Governments in 
an Age of Global Multilevel Governance, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509 (2010); Da-
vid Golemboski, Federalism and the Catholic Principle of Subsidiarity, 45 PUB-
LIUS: J. FEDERALISM 526 (2015). 
 22. Nils Christie, Conflicts as Property, 17 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1977); 
see, e.g., Braithwaite, supra note 9, at 5 (calling Conflicts as Property “[t]he most 
influential text of the restorative tradition”).  
 23. Christie, supra note 22, at 3–4, 7–8. 
 24. Id. at 10–11.  
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This theory of subsidiarity—redistributing responsibility for 
crime and justice from the state to associations of private ac-
tors—presupposed a corresponding theory of subjectivity. Chris-
tie, and the many restorativists who followed him, envisioned 
active, engaged citizens who could govern themselves to a far 
greater extent than the state allowed. Christie criticized how the 
then-dominant ethos of rehabilitation reduced offenders to “ob-
ject[s] for study, manipulation and control.”25 Whatever exter-
nalizing theory the professional applied to understand crime, 
Christie argued—be it biology, personality, or even, as Christie 
was more sympathetic to, class—the focus on social explanation 
took interpersonal conflicts away from the parties themselves.26 
Christie wanted to ask more of offenders. He presumed a moral 
agent, rather than a dependent or pathological subject, who 
could meaningfully experience blame and accountability and 
therefore could actively discuss and make reparations—pro-
cesses that Christie advocated wholly apart from any “interest 
in the treatment or improvement of criminals” or reduced recid-
ivism rates (he was instead after citizen engagement and bot-
tom-up norm elaboration).27 John Braithwaite, another founda-
tional restorative theorist, made a similar claim: “restorative 
justice involves a shift from passive responsibility to which of-
fenders are held by professionals for something they have done 
in the past to citizens taking active responsibility for making 
things right into the future.”28  
Restorativists also want to ask more from victims. If state 
criminal justice systems make offenders into “things,” they erase 
victims entirely, Christie argued.29 Victims are “so thoroughly 
represented,” he elaborated, that they lose doubly in the profes-
sional system: “first vis-à-vis the offender, but secondly and often 
in a more crippling manner by being denied rights to full partic-
ipation in what might have been one of the more important ritual 
encounters in life.”30 Restorativists thus reject the idea that the 
state—as the proper institutional representation of “society” or 
 
 25. Id. at 5. 
 26. Id. (“They are class conflicts—also. But, by stressing this, the conflicts 
are again taken away from the directly involved parties.”).  
 27. Id. at 9. 
 28. John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and De-Professionalization, 13 
GOOD SOC’Y 28, 28 (2004).  
 29. Christie, supra note 22, at 5. 
 30. Id. at 3. 
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the public good—should stand for victims. They instead envision 
(not uncontroversially) victims who want to take personal re-
sponsibility for directly communicating the effects of a criminal 
act through highly personalized and affective narratives. 
Finally, relationality. Restorativists argue for decentralized 
problem-solving by active participants because they conceptual-
ize crime as foundationally a cause and effect of broken relation-
ships. What is to be “restored” are the interpersonal relation-
ships broken—or created—by crime. As such, restorative justice 
seeks to “transcend the merely rational to speak to vital concerns 
of human conscience” such as love, forgiveness, and grace.31 
Hence, in restorative interventions, “superimposed upon the 
stick and the carrot lies ‘the sermon.’”32 As Adam Crawford ex-
plains, “[t]he motivation evoked here is rooted not in evading a 
punishment or seeking to obtain a reward but in avoiding feeling 
bad or fostering commitments to do the right thing.”33 However 
the process begins (perhaps through offender and victim calcu-
lations of self-interest), the restorativist’s hope is always that it 
will involve genuine transformations in self and social relation-
ships.  
Restorativists thus want “less state, greater de-professional- 
ization and a returning of conflicts to their ‘owners.’”34 But they 
make this case for privatizing justice through the logics of mo-
rality and relationality as much or more than through econom-
ics—through self-interest and mutuality, through the stick/car-
rot and the sermon. Many early theorists grounded these double 
principles in a range of value systems including Mennonite 
peacebuilding and New Left traditions of participatory democ-
racy, localism, and community self-management.35 But given 
broader political trends in the United States and elsewhere in 
the late twentieth century, some restorativists also began to ob-
serve uneasily that their “anti-state appeal” coincided “with a 
 
 31. John Braithwaite & Stephen Mugford, Conditions of Successful Reinte-
gration Ceremonies: Dealing with Juvenile Offenders, 34 BRIT. J. CRIMINOL-
OGY 139, 155 (1994). 
 32. Adam Crawford, Situating Restorative Youth Justice in Crime Control 
and Prevention, 2007 ACTA JURIDICA 1, 18. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Adam Crawford, The State, Community and Restorative Justice: Heresy, 
Nostalgia and Butterfly Collecting, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND THE LAW 101, 
112 (Lode Walgrave ed., 2002). 
 35. See infra Parts II.A–B. 
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neo-liberal assault upon the welfare state.”36 To understand how 
early restorativists could simultaneously be critical of neoliber-
alism and yet share some basic presuppositions in common, the 
following section sets forth a perspective on neoliberalism that 
does not “imagin[e] Homo economicus at the center of the 
story.”37 
B. MARKET NEOLIBERALISM, MORAL NEOLIBERALISM  
I use the term neoliberalism in this Article with some hesi-
tation—it’s a slippery analytic that for some readers may 
threaten to obfuscate rather than clarify existing social problems 
and practices. Its primary expounders such as Friedrich Hayek 
and his circle of intellectual collaborators (which included 
Charles Koch) aimed “to bring about the rehabilitation of the 
idea of personal freedom especially in the economic realm,” a 
task that they reasoned would require “purging traditional lib-
eral theory of certain accidental accretions which have become 
attached to it in the course of time” (such as a national collectiv-
ist ethos).38 Numerous scholars in turn have theorized how this 
“revival”39 of liberalism intentionally reinvented it through new 
 
 36. Crawford, supra note 34, at 113. 
 37. Bethany E. Moreton, The Soul of Neoliberalism, 25 SOC. TEXT 103, 106 
(2007). See generally MELINDA COOPER, FAMILY VALUES: BETWEEN NEOLIBER-
ALISM AND THE NEW SOCIAL CONSERVATISM (2017); BETHANY MORETON, TO 
SERVE GOD AND WAL-MART: THE MAKING OF CHRISTIAN FREE ENTERPRISE 
(2010). 
 38. FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE FORTUNES OF LIBERALISM: ESSAYS ON AUS-
TRIAN ECONOMICS AND THE IDEAL OF FREEDOM 192, 237, 238, 244 (Peter G. 
Klein ed., 1992). Hayek explained that “Americans have done me the honour of 
considering the publication of The Road to Serfdom [1944] as the decisive date” 
of the “rebirth of a liberal movement.” Id. at 192. He, however, made clear that 
he roots the genesis of these ideas in the larger endeavor of the members of the 
Mont Pelerin Society, a group of like-minded intellectuals that Hayek founded 
and co-convened. Id. See generally Rachel S. Turner, The ‘Rebirth of Liberalism’: 
The Origins of Neo-Liberal Ideology, 12 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 67 (2007). See also 
DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005); THE ROAD FROM 
MONT PÈLERIN: THE MAKING OF THE NEOLIBERAL THOUGHT COLLECTIVE 
(Philip Mirowski & Dieter Plehwe eds., 2009). Charles Koch attended Mont Per-
lin Society meetings. On Hayek’s influence on Koch, see, e.g., JANE MAYER, 
DARK MONEY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE BILLIONAIRES BEHIND THE RISE OF 
THE RADICAL RIGHT 173 (2017). 
 39. HAYEK, supra note 38, at 237. 
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political, legal, and epistemic understandings of the purpose and 
functions of markets.40 
In this Article, I engage with the term neoliberalism as it is 
now commonly used on the legal left—namely, as an analytic 
both to trace and criticize how public and private institutions 
distribute market-managerial discipline to address public prob-
lems and mold individual subjectivities.41 Hence, when critical 
criminal law scholars describe reforms as neoliberal, they 
broadly invoke governance practices that have expanded over 
the last forty years as a counter to New Deal and Keynesian-
style institutions and especially as a counter to their redistribu-
tive potential. In brief, these practices endeavor to outsource a 
range of social and political functions to nonstate actors. Out-
sourcing embodies a procedural and a substantive dimension. If 
the question is: “Who has the institutional legitimacy and com-
petence to provide a particular good or service, including crime 
control or adjudication?,” a neoliberal approach to governance 
generally favors communities, corporations, families, and indi-
viduals over state institutions. If the question is: “How should 
these nonstate actors order themselves?,” a neoliberal approach 
answers through market ideals such as efficiency and individual 
rationality.  
Hence, from this perspective, to describe criminal justice re-
forms as neoliberal has distinctive (not slippery) meaning: it is 
to anticipate that such reforms will supplant some of the heavy-
 
 40. See Turner, supra note 38, at 78. I should add: scholars have different 
accounts of what justifies the prefix “neo” in neoliberalism. Some illustrate how 
whereas nineteenth century liberal theorists posited that free markets occur “by 
dint of nature,” neoliberal theorists understand market rationality “as achieved 
and normative, as promulgated through law and through social and economic 
policy.” Wendy Brown, American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, 
and De-Democratization, 34 POL. THEORY 690, 694 (2006). Other scholars sug-
gest that the key distinction is epistemic: that neoliberal thinkers, unlike their 
classical liberal predecessors, define the market as an “engine of epistemic 
truth,” an information processor necessary to supplant the limits of rational hu-
man cognition. Philip Mirowski, Hell Is Truth Seen Too Late, 46 BOUNDARY 2 
at 1, 5–12, 7 (2019); see also Amy J. Cohen, Governance Legalism: Hayek and 
Sabel on Reason and Rules, Organization and Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 357. Fi-
nally, others propose that what makes neoliberalism distinctive from earlier 
liberalisms is simply that “it comes after the twentieth-century welfare state 
and is therefore confronted with the task of either overcoming its structures or 
adapting them to new ends.” COOPER, supra note 37, at 314.  
 41. See, e.g., David Singh Grewal & Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and 
Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 16 (2014). 
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handedness of the carceral state with, for example, public- 
private risk-management strategies benchmarked by an in-
crease in cost savings (or in other net utilities)—but not through 
the direct provisioning of public goods and services to offenders 
understood as dependent subjects claiming state care and redis-
tribution. As Marie Gottschalk puts this argument, today main-
stream penal reform is “infused with the core tenets of neoliber-
alism,” which means “that the only penal reforms worth 
pursuing are ones that save money and reduce recidivism.”42  
I will call all this market neoliberalism.43 I suggest that as 
an analytic, market neoliberalism fails to fully capture right-
wing penal reform, particularly the rise of restorative justice 
within it. The question I thus pose is: how should we think of 
moral-relational values within deregulatory governance pro-
jects? By moral-relational values, I mean affective, other- 
oriented commitments encapsulated in terms like “care,” “empa-
thy,” “mutual aid,” and “altruism”—values that, in essence, com-
prise the opposite of atomized, rational, calculating individual-
ism. 
To be sure, many scholars theorize neoliberalism as a moral 
construct. But their arguments are not exactly what I am after. 
For example, prominent scholars have suggested that under neo- 
liberalism, individuals must assume moral responsibility to care 
for themselves—and must do so according to market logics. Per-
haps most famously, Wendy Brown reasons that the neoliberal 
state cultivates, institutionalizes, and rewards practices that 
comprehensively configure human beings as homo œconomicus, 
casting virtually “all dimensions of human life . . . in terms of a 
market rationality” and “conducted according to a calculus of 
utility.”44 Brown describes this as a transformation of what it 
means to be moral: under neoliberalism moral autonomy be-
comes the capacity to care for one’s own needs and interests, and 
moral behavior becomes rational calculations about costs, bene-
fits, and outcomes.45 Ronen Shamir reasons much the same. Neo- 
liberalism, he argues, exhaustively transfigures deontological 
 
 42. GOTTSCHALK, supra note 5, at 79. 
 43. MUEHLEBACH, supra note 18, at 19–20. 
 44. Wendy Brown, Neo-liberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy, 7 
THEORY & EVENT, no. 1, 2003, ¶ 9.  
 45. Id.  
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social-moral concerns into instrumental ones.46 As such, moral 
governance does not demand obedient subjects that comply with 
authoritative rules of law as much as subjects who willingly in-
ternalize self-responsibilization—that is, actors “whose moral 
quality is based on the fact that they rationally assess the costs 
and benefits of a certain act as opposed to other alternative acts” 
and who therefore properly bear the consequences of these ac-
tions.47 In these accounts, neoliberalism means that the moral 
has de-differentiated from the economic: economic processes 
have become moralized as morality has become indistinguish- 
able from economic processes.  
In this Article, I pursue a different inquiry: namely, how do 
moral-relational values—care of the other, not simply care of the 
self—play out in neoliberal governance projects unfolding on the 
ground? Here I turn to Andrea Muehlebach, who examines the 
rise of voluntarism in the social services sector in Italy.48 Chal-
lenging arguments penned by Brown and others, Muehlebach 
describes the expansion of governance programs that limit state 
welfare and public provisioning by devolving responsibility for 
care from the state onto individuals, families, and communi-
ties.49 Yet, she illustrates how the appeal and institutional 
power of such governance programs come not from the fact  
that economic rationalities constantly instrumentalize moral- 
relational ones50—that is, not from transforming care and ser-
vice provision into rational self-interested utility calculations.51 
To the contrary, these programs knit together what we might 
think of as opposites—self-interest and compassion, instrumen-
tality and solidarity, homo œconomicus and homo relationalis—
yet opposites contained in the same overarching belief system.52 
 
 46. Ronen Shamir, The Age of Responsibilization: On Market-Embedded 
Morality, 37 ECON. & SOC’Y 1, 14 (2008). 
 47. Id. at 7 (quoting Thomas Lemke, ‘The Birth of Bio-politics’: Michel Fou-
cault’s Lecture at the Collège de France on Neo-liberal Governmentality, 30 
ECON. & SOC’Y 190, 201 (2001)). 
 48. See generally MUEHLEBACH, supra note 18. 
 49. Id. at 24. 
 50. Id. at 23–25. 
 51. See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN 
BEHAVIOR (1976).  
 52. MUEHLEBACH, supra note 18, at 6–9; Andrea Muehlebach, Complexio 
Oppositorum: Notes on the Left in Neoliberal Italy, 21 PUB. CULTURE 495, 499 
(2009).  
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They tether homo œconomicus to a web of moral-relational ide-
als. And they suggest that how deregulatory and fiscally con-
servative political projects play out may depend crucially on the 
distribution of empathy and altruism, not simply market ration-
ality.53 
I will thus use Muehlebach’s term moral neoliberalism to 
describe a different facet of contemporary bipartisan penal re-
form. In the story I tell, actors bent on advancing “economic free-
dom” and “less state” are underwritten by robust other-oriented 
forms of Christian morality and values such as empathy and for-
giveness. The confluence of these forces has produced a version 
of restorative justice that today is embraced on the libertarian 
and conservative right. It has some early roots, but as we shall 
see, it was for a long time marginal—many prominent early re-
storativists instead hoped to advance left redistributivist poli-
tics. 
II.  RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN THE SHADOW OF 
AMERICAN PENAL TRANSFORMATIONS: 1970s–2000s  
“In the beginning,” Paul McCold observes, “mediation was 
restorative justice, and restorative justice was mediation.”54 I 
begin with restorative justice’s modern institutional roots in 
American community mediation both because it is accurate and 
because it prefigures three (sometimes overlapping, sometimes 
competing) aspirations for mediation that continue to repeat 
throughout restorative justice today. The first is structural, 
namely, aspirations to use mediation to promote social justice 
and societal transformations. The second is relational, namely, 
aspirations to use mediation to nurture the expression of values 
 
 53. I should add: scholars such as Brown theorize how neoliberalism—de-
scribed as an “expressly amoral” market rationality—intersects with extrinsic 
moral belief systems such as neoconservatism. Brown, supra note 40, at 692, 
702. Muehlebach’s argument is different: she argues that neoliberalism itself 
welds together oppositional logics, fabricating economic man and relational man 
into a single moral vision. Muehlebach, supra note 52, at 495–96. In this Article, 
I use Muehlebach’s term moral neoliberalism as analytical frame to describe 
particular contemporary criminal justice practices unfolding on the ground, but 
I do so without intervening in this conceptual disagreement about an extrinsic 
versus intrinsic relationship between neoliberalism and moral systems.  
 54. Paul McCold, The Recent History of Restorative Justice: Mediation, Cir-
cles, and Conferencing, in HANDBOOK OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: A GLOBAL PER-
SPECTIVE 23, 24 (Dennis Sullivan & Larry Tifft eds., 2006). 
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such as empathy, care, and other-oriented spiritual commit-
ments. The third is about economic liberty and efficiency, 
namely, aspirations to use mediation to enable individuals to 
bargain to solve their own problems and, in so doing, to save ju-
dicial resources and rationalize public systems.55  
In this Part, my overarching argument is as follows: com-
munity mediation failed to maintain a bottom-up and structur-
ally oriented vision. But it helped spawn two distinct strands of 
mediation. The first is civil mediation, which institutionalized in 
the 1980s and 1990s, penetrating, even transforming, American 
justice institutions. The second is restorative justice, which 
achieved a low-level presence in the 1990s and aughts and is ex-
panding its institutional reach now. Civil mediation’s success 
within state institutions reflected its transformation into a set of 
economic ideals: individual interest-maximization, efficiency, 
and cost savings. By contrast, restorative justice’s persistent 
noneconomic moral-relational ambitions meant that it stayed 
marginal but also generatively indeterminate—capable of mul-
tiple articulations by reformers across a political spectrum at-
tracted to restorative justice precisely for its moral power. 
 
 55. Several scholars have offered similar descriptions. See, e.g., ROBERT A. 
BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: RESPONDING 
TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 15–22, 24 (1994) 
(distinguishing among different aspirations for mediation including party sat-
isfaction and cost reduction; social justice including by facilitating “the organi-
zation of relatively powerless individuals into communities of interest”; and per-
sonal empowerment and recognition through moral development); Christine B. 
Harrington & Sally Engle Merry, Ideological Production: The Making of Com-
munity Mediation, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 709, 714–17 (1988) (distinguishing 
among the following aims for mediation: the rational delivery of dispute resolu-
tion services; social transformation; personal growth and development); Susan 
Silbey & Austin Sarat, Dispute Processing in Law and Legal Scholarship: From 
Institutional Critique to the Reconstruction of the Juridical Subject, 66 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 437, 445–58 (1989) (distinguishing among the following proponents 
of mediation: the establishment bar and legal elites who wish to rationalize ad-
judication; access to justice proponents who wish to help the socially disadvan-
taged utilize state resources; and quality proponents who wish to empower in-
dividuals and communities to resolve their own conflicts); see also Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, The Many Ways of Mediation: The Transformation of Tradi-
tions, Ideologies, Paradigms, and Practices, 11 NEGOT. J. 217, 220 (1995) (argu-
ing that “those of us who continue to hold a commitment to mediation as a pro-
gressive means for socially transformative ends must be ever-vigilant about our 
practices and the uses to which they might be put”). 
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A. THE COMMUNITY MEDIATION MOVEMENT AND THE RISE OF 
CIVIL MEDIATION  
The community mediation movement began on the political 
left. In the late 1960s and 1970s, lawyers and activists proposed 
reclaiming popular control over conflict resolution, often influ-
enced by their experiences of the civil rights movements and 
struggles for social and economic justice as well as by New Left 
commitments to participatory democracy. Small experiments 
emerged around the country. In 1976, for example, Raymond 
Shonholtz launched the San Francisco Community Boards,56 
which his contemporaries described as a prototype for the move-
ment.57 Shonholtz repeatedly argued that lay—not formal, stat-
ist—practices of conflict resolution could return politics to the 
grassroots.58 Hence, for example, the Community Boards held 
mediations in public in order to create opportunities “to promote 
consciousness-raising.”59 Others like Paul Wahrhaftig, whose 
work on bail reform propelled his interest in community media-
tion, reasoned that through bottom-up dispute resolution “poor 
people and minorities [can] increase their influence over the in-
stitutions and forces that shape their lives.”60 Individualized 
 
 56. See Justin R. Corbett, Raymond Shonholtz: Community Mediation Vi-
sionary, NAFCM (Jan. 9, 2012), http://blog.nafcm.org/2012/01/raymond 
-shonholtz-community-mediation.html [https://perma.cc/HZ4A-XCKJ]. 
 57. Larry Ray, The Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement, 8 PEACE & 
CHANGE 117, 124 (1982); Paul Wahrhaftig, An Overview of Community- 
Oriented Citizen Dispute Resolution Programs in the United States, in 1 THE 
POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 75, 89–92 (Rich-
ard L. Abel ed., 1982). Howard Zehr, a founder of the American restorative jus-
tice movement, see infra Part II.C, likewise complimented the Community 
Boards for “implementing a problem-solving, community-oriented vision of jus-
tice.” ZEHR, supra note 11, at 216.  
 58. Raymond Shonholtz, Justice from Another Perspective: The Ideology 
and Developmental History of the Community Boards Program, in THE POSSI-
BILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE: A CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY MEDIATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 201, 205–08 (Sally Engle Merry & Neal Milner eds., 1995); Ray-
mond Shonholtz, Neighborhood Justice Systems: Work, Structure, and Guiding 
Principles, 5 MEDIATION Q. 3, 15–17, 26–28 (1984) [hereinafter Shonholtz, 
Neighborhood Justice Systems].  
 59. JENNIFER E. BEER, FRIENDS SUBURBAN PROJECT, PEACEMAKING IN 
YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD: REFLECTIONS ON AN EXPERIMENT IN COMMUNITY MEDI-
ATION 218 (1986).  
 60. PAUL WAHRHAFTIG, COMMUNITY DISPUTE RESOLUTION, EMPOWER-
MENT AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE ORIGINS, HISTORY AND FUTURE OF A MOVE-
MENT 63 (2004).  
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complaints, he argued, often reflect community problems and re-
quire collective action to solve them.61 Richard Hofrichter, a crit-
ical scholar, likewise conjured transformations from below: 
through mediation, he suggested, disputants could question the 
formal legal system in ways that inspire “extralegal methods of 
protest and organization of the community around collective in-
terests.”62 In sum, mediation once embodied radical structural 
ambitions.  
Scholars trace the origins of restorative justice to these  
community-based experiments because many tried not to distin-
guish between civil and criminal conflict. Here, criminal media-
tion developed without a singular overarching theory. Some pro-
ponents, like Shonholtz, encouraged communities to recover 
crime control against government intervention: “the greater the 
reliance on police and agency coercion and fear mechanisms, the 
more likely it is that neighborhoods will suffer a decrease in so-
cial responsibility (that is, neighborhood atrophy) and an in-
crease in the levels of fear and insecurity (that is, unacceptable 
behavior).”63 Indeed, the most radical “hoped that mediation 
would provide a genuine alternative to the criminal justice sys-
tem.”64 Other proponents reasoned more modestly that “rela-
tional” conflict—be it civil or criminal—was more satisfactorily, 
fairly, and efficiently resolved through informal, community-
based interventions.65  
An important example of this relational approach, “neigh-
borhood justice centers” emerged in the late 1970s to mediate a 
variety of civil and criminal disputes.66 Funded by the federal 
government, these centers aimed (among other ends) to “contrib-
ute to the reduction of tension and conflict in . . . communities.”67 
 
 61. Id. at 26; see also Wahrhaftig, supra note 57, at 93–94.  
 62. Richard Hofrichter, Neighborhood Justice and the Social Control Prob-
lems of American Capitalism: A Perspective, in 1 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL 
JUSTICE, supra note 57, at 207, 243. 
 63. Shonholtz, Neighborhood Justice Systems, supra note 58, at 16.  
 64. BEER, supra note 59, at 203.  
 65. See Ray, supra note 57, at 117.  
 66. NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE 
CENTERS FIELD TEST: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: FINAL EVALUATION REPORT 
(1980); cf. Wahrhaftig, supra note 57, at 88 (questioning whether an early prom-
inent DOJ-funded experimental neighborhood justice center was, in fact, “grass-
roots” as it was often publicized).  
 67. NAT’L INST. OF JUST., supra note 66, at 1. 
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They mediated criminal disputes that typically involved assault 
and harassment charges among neighbors, family members, and 
intimate partners.68 By 1982, there were roughly 180 community 
mediation centers in the United States that heard civil and crim-
inal cases operating on similar models.69 Larry Ray illustrates 
common cases: “A hot iron flew across the room, barely missing 
the boyfriend. Enraged, he grabbed the ironing board and chased 
the woman around the house,” or “yelling at the neighborhood 
children, the elderly man poised a shotgun out his front win-
dow.”70 Proponents hoped that these mediation centers could 
provide a kind of “community”—standing in for “traditional in-
stitutions such as the extended family, neighborhoods, 
churches”—that may have once managed these sorts of rela-
tional conflicts in lieu of the state.71  
Within the community mediation movement, structural am-
bitions withered first. As one activist community mediator con-
ceded, “[f]or the most part, there is little sign of broader thinking 
among [mediation] users. . . . Mediation is a solution to personal 
discomfort and invasions of private space. The object is to be left 
alone, not to begin organizing.”72 Even more, by the 1980s, the 
left structural case for mediation had generated trenchant left 
critique. Scholars criticized the San Francisco Community 
Boards for adopting a depoliticized style oriented around train-
ing and service delivery—paradoxically empowering mediators 
at the expense of the parties through professional relations of 
 
 68. Id. at 9. 
 69. See Ray, supra note 57, at 122; see also LARRY RAY, ABA SPECIAL 
COMM. ON ALT. DISPUTE RESOLUTION, DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM DIREC-
TORY (1983). For other early descriptions of community mediation that spanned 
civil and criminal conflict, see generally DANIEL MCGILLIS & JOAN MULLEN, 
NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS: AN ANALYSIS OF POTENTIAL MODELS 89–
163 (1977); Albie M. Davis, Community Mediation in Massachusetts: Lessons 
from a Decade of Development, 69 JUDICATURE 307 (1986); and Robert C. Davis, 
Mediation: The Brooklyn Experiment, in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE: ASSESSMENT 
OF AN EMERGING IDEA 154 (Roman Tomasic & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 1982) 
(describing a particularly significant early criminal program that commonly me-
diated felony assault and burglary arrests).  
 70. Ray, supra note 57, at 117.  
 71. Id. at 118; see also Shonholtz, Neighborhood Justice Systems, supra 
note 58, at 11. 
 72. BEER, supra note 59, at 220. Disputants, she observed, “are distinctly 
uninterested in the links between their problems and other people’s except to 
validate the truth of their own claims. Those who do see the connection usually 
find it one more reason for hopelessness.” Id. 
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management and control.73 Nor, they argued, were disputants 
discovering bases of social solidarity such as working-class back-
grounds or common experiences of subordination.74 More gener-
ally, left socio-legal scholars levied the following indictments: 
that mediation relies on techniques of individual dispute resolu-
tion to manage structural contradictions including by disciplin-
ing confrontational politics through “harmony ideology”;75 that 
in modern centralized states there is no such coherent social 
thing called “community,” and if it exists anywhere, it’s probably 
full of hierarchy, inequality, and coercion;76 and that informal 
processes invariably reconstitute professional state control and, 
worse, extend that control to manage marginalized populations 
(often through an illusion of voluntarism).77 In sum, a growing 
left socio-legal consensus argued that community mediation was 
unlikely to achieve anything approximating real community con-
trol over conflict resolution and democratic participation.  
 
 73. See, e.g., Barbara Yngvesson, Local People, Local Problems, and Neigh-
borhood Justice: The Discourse of “Community” in San Francisco Community 
Boards, in THE POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 58 at 379, 381–
82, 397–99. 
 74. Id.; see Laura Nader, When Is Popular Justice Popular?, in THE POSSI-
BILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 58, at 435, 436–40; Judy H. Rothschild, 
Dispute Transformation, the Influence of a Communication Paradigm of Disput-
ing, and the San Francisco Community Boards Program, in THE POSSIBILITY 
OF POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 58 at 265, 286–91; Douglas R. Thomson & 
Frederic L. DuBow, Organizing for Community Mediation: The Legacy of Com-
munity Boards of San Francisco as a Social-Movement Organization, in THE 
POSSIBILITY OF POPULAR JUSTICE, supra note 58 at 169, 171, 179–96.  
 75. Laura Nader, The ADR Explosion - The Implications of Rhetoric in Le-
gal Reform, 8 THE WINDSOR Y.B. OF ACCESS TO JUST. 269, 269 (1988); see also 
Richard L. Abel, The Contradictions of Informal Justice, in 1 THE POLITICS OF 
INFORMAL JUSTICE, supra note 57, at 267, 280–95.  
 76. See, e.g., Sally Engle Merry, Defining “Success” in the Neighborhood 
Justice Movement, in NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE, supra note 69, at 172, 173–79; 
Sally Engle Merry, The Social Organization of Mediation in Nonindustrial So-
cieties, in 2 THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: COMPARATIVE STUDIES 17, 28–
33 (Richard L. Abel. ed., 1982). See generally JEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE 
WITHOUT LAW? 115–37 (1983) (describing how different traditions and under-
standings of “community” are operationalized in informal justice institutions). 
 77. See, e.g., CHRISTINE B. HARRINGTON, SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY 
AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF ALTERNATIVES TO COURT (1985); RICHARD 
HOFRICHTER, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY: THE EXPAN-
SION OF THE INFORMAL STATE (1987); Abel, supra note 75, at 270–80; Hofrichter, 
supra note 62, at 237–40. For early catalogues of these and other criticisms, see 
STANLEY COHEN, AGAINST CRIMINOLOGY 217–19 (1988) and Maureen Cain, Be-
yond Informal Justice, 9 CONTEMP. CRISES 335, 336–40 (1985).  
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Over time, relational ambitions became less salient as well. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, a different set of institutional advocates 
and academic interlocutors untethered civil mediation from 
early grassroots experiments, describing instead how it could ra-
tionalize judicial systems by minimizing transaction costs and 
maximizing individual interests.78 In 1980, Congress passed the 
Dispute Resolution Act to encourage “expeditious, inexpensive, 
equitable, and voluntary resolution of disputes.”79 In 1990, Con-
gress enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act to improve judicial 
efficiency and economy, through various processes including me-
diation.80 That same year, Congress also encouraged administra-
tive agencies to use ADR to yield “decisions that are faster, less 
expensive, and less contentious.”81 Responding to such develop-
ments, Carrie Menkel-Meadow declared that the legal establish-
ment’s use of ADR to “reduce caseloads and increase court effi-
ciency” had crowded out competing visions and values.82 About 
a decade later, Judith Resnik argued that American courts had 
transformed themselves in response to ADR. Judges have be-
come “suspicious of adjudication,” she observed, and prefer ADR 
processes that are “committed to the utility of contract and 
look[] to the participants to validate outcomes through consen-
sual agreements.”83  
This is civil mediation understood as market neoliberal-
ism—the state devolving responsibility for dispute resolution 
and translating it into practices such as efficiency and interest 
maximization. Readers know the critique: it is 1984 vintage 
Owen Fiss. Fiss defended adjudication, which he described as a 
 
 78. For a review, see Silbey & Sarat, supra note 55, at 446–50, 479–84 (de-
scribing the role of “the establishment bar and legal elites” in shaping ADR, 
particularly as a technology that promotes interests over rights).  
 79. Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 96-190, § 2(a)(6), 94 Stat. 17, 17 
(1980). 
 80. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, tit. I, § 102, 104 
Stat. 5089, 5089 (1990). 
 81. Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, Pub. L. No. 101-552, § 2(3), 104 
Stat. 2736, 2736 (1990). For a review of this legislation and the transformation 
of ADR, see also OSCAR G. CHASE, LAW, CULTURE, AND RITUAL: DISPUTING SYS-
TEMS IN CROSS-CULTURAL CONTEXT 99–100 (2005).  
 82. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: 
A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or “The Law of ADR,” 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 3 
(1991). 
 83. Judith Resnik, For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and 
the Death of Adjudication, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 173, 176 (2003).  
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public social process, against mediation, which he assailed as re-
producing freedom-of-contract ideology.84 Tellingly, when schol-
ars responded to Fiss by arguing that mediation also embodies 
moral-relational values—for example, community cohesion, 
healing, and a relational understanding of justice as something 
people give to one another rather than receive from the state85—
Fiss replied that this account was not wrong, just “beside the 
point.”86 Given the 1980s Reagan-style assault on the American 
welfare state, Fiss predicted that mediation could mainstream 
only as part of “the deregulation movement, one that permits 
private actors with powerful economic interests to pursue self-
interest free of community norms.”87 In other words, Fiss ven-
tured that powerful actors would either instrumentalize or re-
fuse whatever moral-relational values mediation could possibly 
encompass in order to advance their own economic self-interest.  
As I have argued elsewhere, many American mediation 
scholars themselves never relinquished more salutary and com-
plex social visions, repeatedly proposing to combine efficiency 
with relational principles.88 But Resnik and Fiss were clearly 
correct to observe that the American civil judiciary used ADR to 
expand market-managerial practices—not love, healing, and 
reconciliation. Moreover, after the 1980s, few American ADR 
scholars continued to theorize community-based mediation. And 
without a kind of “collective private” that could stand for the nor-
mative role of the state, many also ceded to their Fissian critics 
conflict they deemed to trigger the public’s interests. Such con-
 
 84. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). For an ex-
tensive elaboration of this argument, see Amy J. Cohen, Revisiting Against Set-
tlement: Some Reflections on Dispute Resolution and Public Values, 78 FORD-
HAM L. REV. 1143 (2009).  
 85. Andrew W. McThenia & Thomas L. Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 
YALE L.J. 1660, 1665 (1985).  
 86. Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1669–70 (1985). 
 87. Id. at 1672 (internal quotation omitted).  
 88. See Amy J. Cohen, ADR and Some Thoughts on the “Social” in Contem-
porary Legal Thought, in SEARCHING FOR CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THOUGHT 454 
(Justin Desautels-Stein & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2017); Amy J. Cohen, The 
Family, the Market, and ADR, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 91 [hereinafter Cohen, The 
Family]. 
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flicts included, for example, matters of “fundamental constitu-
tional rights”89 and “[r]acial discrimination”90 and, crucially, 
they included crime. That is, many mediation scholars described 
crime as a question of public social order, and therefore properly 
subject to adjudicatory systems, not interpersonal harm and 
therefore subject to mediation.91 As such, and as the community 
mediation movement dissipated, criminal mediation developed 
largely outside of the work of American legal scholars—and 
largely outside of centrist American legal, penal, and political 
power. 
B. THE RISE OF CRIMINAL MEDIATION AS RESTORATIVE JUSTICE  
It would take until the 1990s for restorative justice to solid-
ify into its own academic and programmatic movement. Here, I 
trace a second genealogy, namely that of scholars and practition-
ers whose arguments for alternative dialogic processes emerged 
specifically from criticisms of the American penal system. Many 
shared with community mediation proponents “[a] deep distrust 
of state power; a profound cynicism about professional mo-
tives; . . . [and] a concern for the ‘self-determination’ and ‘em-
powerment’ of the poor and minority groups.”92 But criminal jus-
tice academics and activists had more distinctive targets: they 
attacked ideals such as rehabilitation and individualized behav-
ioral treatment—ideals, they argued, that legitimated prisons as 
salutary institutions when, in fact, they “repress[ed] blacks, the 
poor, the young and various cultural minorities.”93 Encapsulat-
ing this critique, a report published by the American Friends 
Service Committee, a nonprofit Quaker organization, argued 
that “getting the justice system off our backs” means empower-
ing people to “avoid using the criminal justice system to solve 
 
 89. LAWRENCE SUSSKIND & JEFFREY CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IM-
PASSE: CONSENSUAL APPROACHES TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES 17, 76–77, 
192 (1987).  
 90. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, For and Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses 
of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REV. 485, 500 (1985). 
 91. In 1997, for example, Carrie Menkel-Meadow observed that criminal 
mediation was intensely controversial among ADR professionals. See Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Disputes of Its Own: Conflicts 
Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1907 (1997).  
 92. GARLAND, supra note 16, at 56. 
 93. Id. at 55. 
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social problems.”94 Its authors hoped that “[a] web of available 
community services, controlled by those who need and use them, 
could persuade people to turn to these agencies, rather than to 
the police, for assistance in social disturbances and family dis-
putes.”95  
Among criminal justice reformers and mediation propo-
nents, restorativists coalesced around a distinctive claim: specif-
ically, that crime represents a rupture in personal and social re-
lationships, not an offence against an abstract state.96 In this 
section, I illustrate how, within the emergent restorative justice 
movement, arguments about structural transformation, moral-
relational values, and market freedom continued to compete and 
intertwine. Here I tell mostly an American story—even as re-
storative justice developed simultaneously (and often more ro-
bustly) in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the United King-
dom, and other countries in Europe—because I am interested in 
tracing how structural, relational, and economic justifications 
combine in American restorative justice theory and practice in 
different ways over time.  
In this section, let me begin with the economic. In 1977, 
Randy Barnett, an American law professor and one of the first 
scholars to use the term restorative justice, theorized it as part 
of broader libertarian transformations in the economy including 
deregulation.97 “Today,” Barnett explained, “there is an increas-
ing desire to allow each individual to govern his own life as he 
 
 94. AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON 
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 170 (1971). 
 95. Id. at 166. On the role that the American Friends Service Committee 
played in trying to establish community mediation programs as alternatives to 
the criminal justice system, see BEER, supra note 59, at 203–05. See also 
Wahrhaftig, supra note 57, at 75–77, 85–88, 93–95. 
 96. Many early theorists elaborated this claim by describing how premod-
ern and indigenous legal systems blurred distinctions between tort and crime. 
For a review of these arguments and a critical analysis of how such “origin sto-
ries” function in restorative theory and practice, see Kathleen Daly, Restorative 
Justice: The Real Story, 4 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 55, 61–64, 71–73 (2002). 
 97. Randy E. Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigm of Criminal Justice, 87 
ETHICS 279, 284–91 (1977). Tony Marshall suggests that the first use of restor-
ative justice is often ascribed to Randy Barnett. Tony F. Marshall, Restorative 
Justice: An Overview, in A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE READER 30 (Gerry Johnstone 
ed., 2003). Others credit Albert Eglash with coining the term. See Albert Eglash, 
Beyond Restitution: Creative Restitution, in RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
91, 91 (Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway eds., 1975). 
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sees fit provided he does not violate the rights of others.”98 
Crime, he argued, is not an offence against society; rather it is 
“an offense by one individual against the rights of another. The 
victim has suffered a loss. Justice consists of the culpable of-
fender making good the loss he has caused.”99 As such, Barnett 
reasoned that socially oriented state interests involved in man-
aging crime—“deterrence, reformation, and disablement”—
should occur only as an effect of material restitution.100  
Barnett thus articulated criminal dispute resolution as a set 
of market practices. He proposed to monetize the relationship 
between offender and victim, theorizing them both as rational 
actors. As such, the offender could “self-determin[e]” his sen-
tence: “The harder he worked, the faster he would make restitu-
tion. He would be the master of his fate and would have to face 
that responsibility.”101 Likewise, the offender and victim could 
“negotiate a reduced payment in return for a guilty plea” 
through arbitration or facilitated conversation.102 And once guilt 
was established, private companies could perform numerous 
functions saving public money (for example, companies could sell 
victim crime insurance, create and manage noncustodial or cus-
todial work opportunities for unemployed offenders, and engage 
in debt-collection).103  
Although widely cited and anthologized by restorativists for 
its bold anti-punitive vision (“What then is there to stop us from 
overthrowing the paradigm of punishment and its penal sys-
tem . . . ?,” Barnett asked), his specific proposals did not inspire 
action.104 They were too radical for policymakers who—even as 
 
 98. Id. at 284. 
 99. Id. at 287–88. 
 100. Id. at 282–83. 
 101. Id. at 294. 
 102. Id. at 290. 
 103. Id. at 288–91, 298. 
 104. Id. at 294 (proceeding to consider and respond to potential objections). 
For popular restorative justice anthologies where Barnett’s article appears, see 
A RESTORATIVE JUSTICE READER, supra note 97, at 46 and 1 RESTORATIVE JUS-
TICE: CRITICAL CONCEPTS IN CRIMINOLOGY 34 (Carolyn Hoyle ed., 2010). Bar-
nett also influenced Howard Zehr. For example, in 1985, Zehr wrote, “Randy 
Barnett has suggested that state-centered and punishment-centered assump-
tions constitute . . . a paradigm, and that this paradigm is in the process of 
breaking down. We may, he suggests, be on the verge of a revolution in our 
understanding of crime and justice.” Howard Zehr, Retributive Justice, Restor-
ative Justice, NEW PERSP. ON CRIME AND JUST., no.4, Sept. 1985, at 6. 
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they liberalized and commodified crime control—simultaneously 
intensified state punishment. For restorativists, the problem 
was different. Barnett’s vision lacked the communitarian spirit 
and moral-relational commitments that they would use to knit 
together an alternative anti-statist movement. “When restitu-
tion is reduced to ‘the cheque is in the mail,’” Braithwaite and 
Mugford argued, “matters of deep moral concern have been re-
duced to mere money, to the ubiquitous question ‘how much?’”105  
In the 1980s, the first American scholar-practitioners to im-
plement restorativist ideals clearly prioritized relational values. 
They created “explicitly restorative mediation practices” distinct 
from “the first generation [community] mediation movement.”106 
Often called Victim Offender Reconciliation Programs (VORPs), 
these practices reflected Christian peacemaking perspectives—
not Barnett’s market libertarianism. Like Barnett, VORP prac-
titioners argued that crime is “a conflict between people, a viola-
tion against a person, not an offense against the state.”107 But 
they ranked restitution as an important yet secondary means of 
addressing the emotional and informational needs of victims and 
offenders.108 “Our first goal is reconciliation,” explained an early 
VORP training manual, “we focus on the relational aspects of 
crime. Attitudes, feelings, and needs of both victims and offend-
ers must be taken very seriously. Healing is important.”109  
These early reformers, many affiliated with the Mennonite 
church, wished significantly to limit state incarceration (indeed, 
in the early 1980s some joined incipient movements for prison 
abolition).110 Some reformers expressed ambivalence about 
 
 105. Braithwaite & Mugford, supra note 31, at 155. 
 106. McCold, supra note 54, at 24. 
 107. Zehr, supra note 104, at 12. 
 108. PACT: INST. OF JUSTICE & MENNONITE CENT. COMM. OFFICE OF CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE, THE VORP BOOK: A RESOURCE OF THE NATIONAL VICTIM OF-
FENDER RECONCILIATION RESOURCE CENTER III-7 (1984) [hereinafter THE 
VORP BOOK]; Mark Umbreit, Mediation of Victim Offender Conflict, 1988 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 85, 91 (“Rather than a primary emphasis upon restitution collec-
tion, many victim offender mediation and reconciliation programs first empha-
size the importance of allowing enough time to address the frequent need for 
information about the offense and the related feelings of both parties. Restitu-
tion is an important additional goal, but for many programs, only primarily as 
a symbol of conflict resolution or ‘reconciliation.’”).  
 109. THE VORP BOOK, supra note 108, at II-5 (second emphasis added). 
 110. See, e.g., JOSHUA DUBLER & VINCENT LLOYD, BREAK EVERY YOKE: RE-
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working with the state, anticipating that restorative ideals need 
the “staying power of religious conviction” and preferred to work 
with offenders and victims that made their way into community 
centers and church basements.111 Yet many forged partnerships 
with courts determined “to accept only certain kinds of cases 
which would have gone to jail otherwise.”112 Hence, early state-
affiliated VORP programs prioritized referrals for felony prop-
erty offenses such as burglary, theft, and armed robbery as well 
as negligent homicide and sometimes also assault.113 Mark Um-
breit, a Christian theorist who would become particularly re-
nowned for his empirical writing on restorative justice, encour-
aged VORP practitioners to consider whether, given prison 
conditions and the possibilities of net-widening, it is “responsi-
ble . . . to offer any sentencing options—even VORP—unless it is 
a genuine alternative to incarceration.”114 In arguing for decar-
ceral policies, Umbreit stressed that “[t]he Christian church is 
based on the fundamental concepts of love, forgiveness, and rec-
onciliation.”115 
 Thomas Noakes-Duncan argues that such VORP activism 
“marked a significant theological shift among Mennonites”—one 
that placed the “state as much as the church . . . under the reign 
of God’s justice”116 and inspired a generation of Mennonites that 
broke with more conservative tradition attentive to how Jesus 
embodied “radical political action.”117 In the 1970s, a strand of 
Mennonite activists “were becoming sensitized to ‘structural 
 
LIGION, JUSTICE, AND THE ABOLITION OF PRISONS (forthcoming 2019) (manu-
script at 156–75) (on file with author).  
 111. Duane Ruth-Heffelbower, Presentation to the 4th Annual Restorative 
Justice Conference: Toward a Christian Theology of Church and Society as It 
Relates to Restorative Justice (Oct. 25, 1996), http://ruth-heffelbower.us/docs/ 
speech.html [https://perma.cc/3PLW-WPLE].  
 112. THE VORP BOOK, supra note 108, at III-7. 
 113. Id. at III-9; MARK UMBREIT, CRIME AND RECONCILIATION: CREATIVE 
OPTIONS FOR VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS 100 (1985).  
 114. Mark Umbreit, Introduction to THE VORP BOOK, supra note 108, at I-
1, I-5. 
 115. UMBREIT, supra note 113, at 77. 
 116. Thomas Noakes-Duncan, The Emergence of Restorative Justice in Ec-
clesial Practice, 5(2) J. MORAL THEOLOGY 1, 3 (2016).  
 117. LEO DRIEDGER & DONALD B. KRAYBILL, MENNONITE PEACEMAKING: 
FROM QUIETISM TO ACTIVISM 149 (1994) (quoting JOHN H. YODER, THE POLI-
TICS OF JESUS 12 (1972)); see also id. at 150–53, 153 tbl.6.1.  
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sins’—patterns of social organization that perpetuated oppres-
sion” including social and economic injustice.118 In 1971, a large 
Mennonite denomination adopted a statement calling on mem-
bers to “confront those who because of their greed cause injustice 
and oppression” and to “identify with the oppressed and partici-
pate in ministries of love and service in their behalf.”119 Noakes-
Duncan traces the rise of VORPs from within this peacemaking 
tradition—VORPs were meant to be “an alternative prophetic 
witness to the punitive criminal justice system.”120  
By all accounts, Howard Zehr pioneered this vision. In 1978, 
he founded the first American VORP in Elkhart, Indiana and 
soon became the Director of the Mennonite Central Committee’s 
U.S. Office of Criminal Justice.121 In 1985, when about thirty 
more VORPs had opened,122 Zehr published a paper arguing for 
restoration against punishment defined as the intentional inflic-
tion of suffering,123 or against, as Christie elaborated, punish-
ment defined as “that suffering which the judge [finds] necessary 
to apply in addition to those unintended constructive sufferings 
the offender would go through in his restitutive actions vis-à-vis 
the victim.”124 Zehr and his colleagues thus aimed to draw a prin-
cipled distinction between actions agreed upon or imposed with 
the aim of restoration and conflict resolution versus actions im-
posed with the aim “of causing suffering” (at least for offenders 
capable of assuming responsibility and open to moral suasion).125  
 
 118. Id. at 150.  
 119. Id. at 150 & n.27 (referencing a 1971 statement endorsed by the Gen-
eral Conference of the Mennonite Church).  
 120. Noakes-Duncan, supra note 116, at 17. 
 121. See Howard Zehr, Curriculum Vita, Full Version, E. MENNONITE UNIV., 
ZEHR INST. FOR RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20131015052157/http://emu.edu/cjp/restorative-justice/howard-zehr-cv/cv.pdf. 
The first ever VORP, which was also Mennonite affiliated, opened in 1974 in 
Kitchener, Ontario. For a detailed history, see Dean E. Peachy, The Kitchener 
Experiment, in MEDIATION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14–24 (Martin Wright & 
Burt Galaway eds., 1989).  
 122. JOHN GEHM & MARK UMBREIT, NATIONAL VORP DIRECTORY (1985). 
 123. Zehr, supra note 104, at 3, 13.  
 124. Christie, supra note 22, at 10.  
 125. See WESLEY CRAGG, THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT: TOWARDS A THE-
ORY OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 213 (1992). To be sure, actual experiences of res-
toration and punishment may blur as offenders assume significant compensa-
tory burdens. For thoughtful analysis of how in restorative processes, 
participants often combine multiple justice aims that include retributive cen-
sure, rehabilitative interventions, and restoration, see Daly, supra note 96, at 
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Also like Christie, Zehr proposed direct negotiations be-
tween offenders and victims that would “encourage mutual aid, 
a sense of mutuality, of community, of fellowship.”126 To that 
end, he described offenders as active moral agents—not subjects 
to be acted upon either through rehabilitation (“terribly suscep-
tible to abuse”) or retribution (“one social injury replaced by an-
other”).127 But instead as people who could appreciate the conse-
quences of their actions and want to make things right.128 This 
will to empower, he reasoned, would emerge through personal 
encounters with victims who also need to reclaim agency in the 
aftermath of crime. If victims could speak their needs and feel-
ings—including for a statement of moral blamelessness and the 
possibility of forgiveness—then offenders could relinquish defen-
sive rationalizations and practice accountability by repairing 
and vindicating the wrongs that victims experienced through ex-
tensive acts of reparations.129 Or at least that was Zehr’s vision: 
transformations in offender and victim subjectivity and, through 
subjectivity, relationships. Otherwise, he argued, reforms like 
“victim compensation” or “alternative sanctions” would only 
tinker at the edges of what may anyway be, he conceded, an im-
penetrable retributive state system.130  
This moral-relational movement, which Zehr played a foun-
dational role in creating, was never uniformly grounded in the 
political left—its deeply rooted religious commitments defy sim-
ple political categorization or singular interpretations. As Part 
III elaborates, politically conservative Christian writers contrib-
uted to early restorative theory.131  
But Zehr himself explicitly and repeatedly linked interper-
sonal reconciliation to aspirations for social justice and struc-
tural transformations.132 Based on readings of the Old and New 
 
59–60. 
 126. Zehr, supra note 104, at 13. 
 127. Id. at 6, app. 15. 
 128. Id. at 13. 
 129. Id. at 1–3. 
 130. Id. at 3–4, 6; see also ZEHR, supra note 11, at 226. 
 131. See infra Part III.B.  
 132. Zehr also reminded his readers to consider “the politics of paradigm 
change.” Zehr, supra note 104. “Make no mistake,” he argued, “the criminal jus-
tice industry is big business, shot through with all kinds of self-interest, and 
will not be changed easily.” Id. at 14. 
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Testaments, Zehr described restorative justice as biblical jus-
tice—a practice of living in right spiritual, social, and material 
relationships; that is, of restoring shalom.133 Restoring shalom, 
he explained, requires confronting substantive injustice. Formal 
adversarial systems embed substantive inequalities: “Since the 
[formal] process aims to treat unequals equally, existing social 
and political inequities are ignored and maintained.”134 By con-
trast, restoring shalom does not seek formal equality before the 
law, but “to make things better.”135 In Zehr’s words:  
Justice is not designed to make the status quo. Indeed, its intent is to 
shake up the status quo, to improve, to move toward shalom. The move 
toward shalom is not necessarily good news to everyone. In fact, it is 
downright bad news to the oppressor. This too stands in contrast to 
that [formally equal] justice which—by working to maintain “order”—
works in fact to maintain the present order, the status quo, even when 
it is unjust.136 
Zehr thus saw personal restoration working together with social 
transformations.  
For Zehr, social transformations become possible, even if 
only in small and localized ways, because biblical law operates 
not through command as much as through deliberation. In his 
words: “Old Testament law does not have the sense of rigidity 
and formalism that our law does. [It] points a direction, and it 
must be discussed.”137 Braithwaite elaborates this dialogic ambi-
tion: “the shalom way of thinking about justice,” he explains, 
means that stakeholders empowered “to repair the harm of an 
injustice will produce outcomes that are more distributively sat-
isfying to [them] than a process that seeks to deliver equal pun-
ishments to equal wrongs.”138 On this logic, restorative media-
tions “give little people chances to strike little blows against 
 
 133. Id. at 10–12; ZEHR, supra note 11, at 130–47.  
 134. ZEHR, supra note 11, at 79. 
 135. Id. at 140. 
 136. Id. Zehr writes further: “[t]he biblical approach to justice shows that 
restorative justice must often be transformative justice. To make things right, 
it may be necessary not merely to return to situations and people to their origi-
nal condition, but to go beyond.” Id. at 190.  
 137. Zehr, supra note 104, at 10 (emphasis added). 
 138. John Braithwaite, Traditional Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, REC-
ONCILIATION, AND PEACEBUILDING 214, 232 (Jennifer J. Llewellyn & Daniel 
Philpott eds., 2014).  
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oppression.”139 Zehr’s aspirations thus recall community media-
tion: that direct egalitarian deliberations can help reveal how 
“socially structured cleavages” shape harm, conflict, and jus-
tice—inspiring greater feelings of social responsibility alongside 
personal responsibility for crime.140  
Zehr, Umbreit, and other early restorativists had some 
small influence on state practice. In 2001, approximately 320 
criminal mediation programs operated in the United States and 
Canada.141 Most VORPs had become Victim Offender Mediations 
(VOMs)—a secularization meant to describe court-based pro-
cesses rather than the more value-laden and religious goals of 
reconciliation.142 It is hard to generalize about these highly lo-
calized programs. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, for example, recounts 
facilitated dialogue among victims, offenders, and family mem-
bers taking place within progressive court systems, some of 
which, she suggests, also looked to indigenous American justice 
 
 139. Braithwaite & Mugford, supra note 31, at 158. 
 140. Howard Zehr & Harry Mika, Fundamental Concepts of Restorative Jus-
tice, 1 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 47, 55 (1998). Christie likewise envisioned robust 
deliberations that require lay people to debate:  
When the victim is small and the offender big—in size or power—how 
blameworthy then is the crime? And what about the opposite case, the 
small thief and the big house-owner? If the offender is well educated, 
ought he then to suffer more or maybe less, for his sins? Or if he is 
black, or if he is young, or if the other party is an insurance company, 
or if his wife has just left him, or if his factory will break down if he has 
to go to jail . . . . 
Christie, supra note 22, at 8; see also W. Richard Evarts, Compensation Through 
Mediation: A Conceptual Framework, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE, RESTITUTION, AND 
RECONCILIATION 15, 17 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1990) (“[T]he victim 
must repair the harm within his power to address. This may take the form of 
permitting compensation to be paid to him, reconciling himself to the injury, 
forgiving the perpetrator and contributing to a better social order that will not 
foster conditions under which crime arises.”). 
 141. Gordon Bazemore & Mark Umbreit, A Comparison of Four Restorative 
Conferencing Models, JUV. JUST. BULL., Feb. 2001, at 2. In 1994, the American 
Bar Association recommended that “federal, state, territorial, and local govern-
ments . . . incorporate publicly or privately operated victim-offender media-
tion/dialogue programs into their criminal justice processes.” AM. BAR ASS’N, 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1 (1994), 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/directories/policy/1994_am_ 
101b.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVL8-YB8S]. 
 142. MARK UMBREIT & MARILYN P. ARMOUR, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE DIA-
LOGUE 113–14 (2010).  
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practices for inspiration.143 (Early experiments in Minnesota led 
by Kay Pranis are an apt example.144) At the same time, many 
early programs routinized, including by becoming part of the sys-
temic logics they were supposed to challenge (“I am going to 
VORP that kid,” prosecutors might threaten).145 And most  
focused only on juveniles and minor crimes.146 As  
scholar-practitioner Harry Mika recalls of this period, few re-
storative programs attempted to reach the core of the deeply ra-
cialized adult felony sentences that were increasingly compris-
ing American mass incarceration.147  
Despite its limited reach in practice, in the 1990s and early 
2000s restorative justice inspired a good deal of criticism in 
 
 143. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Restorative Justice: What Is It and Does It 
Work?, 3 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 161, 167–68 (2007).  
 144. See Kay Pranis, A State Initiative Toward Restorative Justice: The Min-
nesota Experience, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
493, 494, 499–502 (Burt Galaway & Joe Hudson eds., 1996); Kay Pranis, The 
Minnesota Restorative Justice Initiative: A Model Experience, CRIME VICTIMS 
REP., May–June 1997, reprinted in NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, RESTORATIVE JUS-
TICE SYMPOSIA SUMMARY 7 (1998), https://ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248890.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HA5P-4SDT]. I should add that compared to countries such as 
Canada and New Zealand—where the modern genealogies of restorative justice 
are extensively intertwined with indigenous struggles—in the United States, 
there has been less cross-fertilization and fewer efforts to translate and institu-
tionalize indigenous justice practices into formal state systems. For an overview 
of a pioneering act of institutionalization in New Zealand, see Amy J. Cohen & 
Ilana Gershon, When the State Tries to See Like a Family: Cultural Pluralism 
and the Family Group Conference in New Zealand, 38 POL. & LEGAL ANTHRO-
POLOGY REV. 9 (2015). In the United States, perhaps the most prominent exam-
ple of indigenous borrowing followed from the Navajo Nation’s creation of the 
Peacemaker Court in 1982. See Robert Yazzie & James W. Zion, Navajo Restor-
ative Justice: The Law of Equality and Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: INTER-
NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra, at 157, 160, 171–73. Navajo nation courts ap-
plied a theory of justice meant “to restore an offender to good standing within a 
group” and generated interest on the part of both scholars and court adminis-
trators. Id. at 172; see also Howard L. Brown, The Navajo Nation’s Peacemaker 
Division: An Integrated, Community-Based Dispute Resolution Forum, 24 AM. 
INDIAN L. REV. 297, 307–08 (1999–2000); Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes from It:” 
Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 175, 186–87 (1994). For critical anal-
ysis, see Carole E. Goldberg, Overextended Borrowing: Tribal Peacemaking Ap-
plied in Non-Indian Disputes, 72 WASH. L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1997).  
 145. RUTH MORRIS, STORIES OF TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE 19 (2000).  
 146. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 141, at 2. 
 147. Telephone conversation between Amy J. Cohen and Harry Mika (Nov. 
14, 2018). 
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scholarship. From outside the movement, legal scholars chal-
lenged both its economic and relational logics. From within, left 
restorativists worried about losing hold of an animating struc-
tural vision. 
Legal scholars first. In a widely cited 1994 article, Jennifer 
Gerarda Brown pursued two lines of argument: she described 
mediation as private market bargaining, which she rejected as 
morally wrong to resolve public conflict. And she described how 
restorative justice aims to interject moral-relational feeling into 
mediation, which she rejected as the state contravening the ide-
als of individual liberalism.148  
To briefly elaborate, Brown submitted that in mediation 
parties advance their own self-interest. Hence she reasoned that 
in VOMs victims will maximize restitution, offenders will max-
imize leniency, and prosecutors and other court officials may 
maximize settlement, potentially against the desires of victims 
and offenders.149 Brown did not cite Barnett for this hell of self-
interest; she simply rejected his overarching principles: “[a]llow-
ing offenders to buy their way out of prison with monetary and 
nonmonetary compensation to victims unacceptably confounds 
the private goals of mediation and the public goals of criminal 
law.”150 (Albert W. Alschuler had earlier warned of public out-
rage and even personal vengeance if citizens perceived that an 
overburdened legal system was offering alternative processes “to 
encourage the victim and the victimizer to resolve their differ-
ences and go on their way.”151)  
In 1994, however, Brown’s central target was not Barnett 
(or arguments about efficiency and system rationalization), but 
rather Zehr and his colleagues and their fixation with relation-
ships and restoration.152 Here Brown suggested that when VOM 
does not collapse into a bargaining situation where everyone jos-
tles around their own interests it’s because restorative mediators 
 
 148. See generally Jennifer Gerarda Brown, The Use of Mediation to Resolve 
Criminal Cases: A Procedural Critique, 43 EMORY L.J. 1247 (1994).  
 149. Id. at 1268–69, 1271–72. 
 150. Id. at 1253. 
 151. Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adju-
dicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1810 (1986).  
 152. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 148, at 1259–62 (on “Victim-Offender Rec-
onciliation: The Christian Roots of VOM”). 
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successfully advance fellow-feeling.153 But “[i]n the United 
States,” Brown countered, “both victims and offenders can be ex-
pected to care about their individual rights and desires.”154 The 
state should therefore remediate individual rights through for-
mal procedure grounded in traditional penal theories: deter-
rence, rehabilitation, retribution, incapacitation—ends, she im-
plied, that already represent majoritarian public morality.155 It 
should not authorize private actors to mold the moral feelings of 
others according to an ethic of care.156 For this reason, feminist 
critics blocked restorative justice “for cases of gendered violence 
in most world jurisdictions” by arguing, like Brown, against an 
ethic of relationality.157 Feminist critics worried about restora-
tive justice’s disciplinary effects on female victims who may gift 
altruism and compassion when instead they need authoritative 
processes to adjudicate relationships, not heal relationships 
through reparations.158  
 
 153. Id. at 1277–81. 
 154. Id. at 1295.  
 155. Id. at 1301. Brown wrote: 
[T]he traditional goals of the criminal law represent the state’s ra-
tionale for exercising coercive power to punish its citizens. VOM’s ina-
bility to reconcile its effects with these traditional goals causes VOM 
to expand the reach of state coercion to achieve goals the public may 
not value. Meanwhile, VOM compromises the state’s ability to use its 
coercive power to achieve retribution, incapacitation, and general de-
terrence. 
Id. 
 156. Id. at 1273–82. 
 157. Sarah Curtis-Fawley & Kathleen Daly, Gendered Violence and Restor-
ative Justice: The Views of Victim Advocates, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
603, 609 (2005). 
 158. In the North American context, see, for example, Lisa G. Lerman, Me-
diation of Wife Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact of Informal Dispute Resolution 
on Women, 7 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57 (1984); Kelly Rowe, The Limits of the 
Neighborhood Justice Center: Why Domestic Violence Cases Should Not Be Me-
diated, 34 EMORY L.J. 855 (1985); Dianna R. Stallone, Decriminalization of Vi-
olence in the Home: Mediation in Wife Battering Cases, 2 LAW & INEQ. 493 
(1984); and Evelyn Zellerer, Community-Based Justice and Violence Against 
Women: Issues of Gender and Race, 20 INT’L J. COMP. & APPLIED CRIM. JUST. 
233 (1996). See also AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 141, at 2 (“Screening [for VOM] 
would also rule out mediation in most cases involving domestic violence.”). 
There were, however, early exceptions. For authors advocating restorative ap-
proaches to domestic, intimate, and sexual harm, see, for example, Donna 
Coker, Enhancing Autonomy for Battered Women: Lessons from Navajo Peace-
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Brown and others were also troubled by the potential effects 
of relational processes on offenders.159 They anticipated that 
some offenders would accept unduly harsh and onerous “restor-
ative” sentences arrived upon collaboratively but with few due 
process protections.160 Or perhaps accept onerous sentences ar-
rived upon not so collaboratively: Richard Delgado, for example, 
conjured disciplinary mediations where a “hurt, vengeful victim” 
and a “middle-class, moralistic mediator” together “participate 
in a paroxysm of righteousness” against “an inarticulate, uned-
ucated, socially alienated youth,” likely an offender of color.161 
And what exactly, critical scholars continued to ask, comprises a 
“community” willing and able to support offenders and victims 
 
making, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1 (1999); Mary P. Koss, Blame, Shame, and Commu-
nity: Justice Responses to Violence Against Women, 55 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1332 
(2000); Mary P. Koss, Karen J. Bachar & C. Quince Hopkins, An Innovative 
Application of Restorative Justice to the Adjudication of Selected Sexual Of-
fenses, in CRIME PREVENTION: NEW APPROACHES 321 (Helmut Kury & Joachim 
Obergfell-Fuchs eds., 2003); and Joan Pennell & Gale Burford, Feminist Praxis: 
Making Family Group Conferencing Work, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND FAM-
ILY VIOLENCE 108 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2002). A parallel 
set of feminist debates was happening within civil mediation. Beginning in the 
1980s, feminist critics argued that mediation was inappropriate for divorce and 
other civil family disputes when domestic violence had occurred in the underly-
ing relationship. For a review of these debates, see Cohen, The Family, supra 
note 88, at 118–19. 
 159. See Brown, supra note 148, at 1265, 1282–91; see also Sharon Levrant, 
Francis T. Cullen, Betsy Fulton & John F. Wozniak, Reconsidering Restorative 
Justice: The Corruption of Benevolence Revisited?, 45 CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 7–10 
(1999). 
 160. See Brown, supra note 148, at 1282–91; Levrant, Cullen, Fulton & Woz-
niak, supra note 159. To be sure, restorativists themselves advanced arguments 
for procedural safeguards, proportionality, and protection of individual rights. 
See, e.g., Daniel W. Van Ness, Legal Issues of Restorative Justice, in RESTORA-
TIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE: REPAIRING THE HARM OF YOUTH CRIME 263 (Gordon 
Bazemore & Lode Walgrave eds., 1999). 
 161. Richard Delgado, Goodbye to Hammurabi: Analyzing the Atavistic Ap-
peal of Restorative Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751, 766, 768 (2000). Delgado’s cri-
tique of informalism was deeply suspicious:  
The timing of VOM’s advent is also curious . . . . Juries were beginning 
to contain, for the first time, substantial numbers of nonwhite mem-
bers, and at least one scholar of color would soon encourage black ju-
rors to acquit young black men, who are, in their view more useful to 
the community free than behind bars. Could it be that VOM arose, con-
sciously or not, in response to the threat of jury nullification? 
Id. at 770. 
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through beneficent self-regulation?162 Numerous legal scholars 
thus defended state power against moral-relational mediation 
(even if sometimes reluctantly so, a posture Maureen Cain aptly 
described as “defensive formalism”163).  
From within the restorative justice movement the most 
pressing challenges appeared different. Vexing questions cen-
tered less on concerns with the disciplinary effects of informal 
relational processes than on concerns with cooptation164 and in-
dividuation.165 Harry Mika, for example, argued that personal-
ized, relational interventions had produced an “astructural bias” 
when restorative justice, like community mediation, meant to 
engage victims and offenders with “the structural sources of 
their collective difficulties.”166 As he put it:  
[C]rime and delinquency, and all forms of conflict for that matter, are 
linked to larger social issues that are often beyond the immediate con-
trol and manipulation of disputants. There are social problems in com-
munities—unemployment, racism, violence, etc.—that give rise to con-
flict between individuals. How does the mediation process, or how does 
the VORP, mindful of its explicit restorative, social justice goals, ad-
dress these larger issues?167  
Dennis Sullivan and Larry Tifft made a similar claim, arguing 
that restorative justice was institutionalizing apart from atten-
tion to social and economic conditions: 
 
 162. See generally Robert Weisberg, Restorative Justice and the Danger of 
“Community,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 343.  
 163. Cain, supra note 77, at 339. 
 164. See ZEHR, supra note 11, app. 2; see also Zehr, supra note 104, at 14 
(“[W]ill VORP be just another alternative program, an alternative that becomes 
institutionalized, ossified, coopted until it is just another program, and perhaps 
not an alternative at all?”). Restorativists especially worried that material res-
titution would eclipse interpersonal reconciliation. Umbreit, for example, de-
scribed the “greatest danger” facing the field as “a utilitarian and exclusive fo-
cus on simply determining restitution and payment” crowding out 
“opportunities for addressing the emotional issues surrounding crime and vic-
timization, including even the possibility of forgiveness and reconciliation.” 
MARC S. UMBREIT, ROBERT B. COATES & BORIS KALANJ, VICTIM MEETS OF-
FENDER: THE IMPACT OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND MEDIATION 157–58 (1994). 
 165. See Harry Mika, Mediation Interventions and Restorative Justice: Re-
sponding to the Astructural Bias, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE ON TRIAL: PITFALLS 
AND POTENTIALS OF VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION 559 (Heinz Messmer & 
Hans-Uwe Otto eds., 1992). 
 166. Id. at 559, 566. 
 167. Harry Mika, The Practice and Prospect of Victim-Offender Programs, 
46 SMU L. REV. 2191, 2202 (1993) (emphasis added). 
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[A]s we look over the landscape of existing programs of restorative jus-
tice, we continue to see a lack of concern over the structural conditions, 
the political-economic foundations that determine whether the per-
sonal integration and reintegration of a person into his or her commu-
nity will be possible. . . . How can a person find support to heal amid 
social arrangements that have little or no ability to meet personal 
needs, indeed, that are structured to deny the meeting of essential 
needs?168  
Some early left restorativists thus began to ask if restorative 
practice was too individuated, too personalized, too private,169 
and too disconnected from structural and redistributive concerns 
with economic and social inequality.170 Others predicted that re-
storativists would “ultimately stand with libertarians on many 
issues, because they question the value of much government in-
tervention.”171 Hence, we might ask, were restorativists sum-
moning themselves into broader “policies of deregulation and 
market freedom” that scholars argue were transforming Ameri-
can criminal justice administration?172  
C. AMERICAN PENAL TRANSFORMATIONS  
Here I must pull back: the theory and practice of restorative 
justice described above, affiliated with scholars such as Zehr and 
Umbreit, emerged against the background of broad social and 
 
 168. DENNIS SULLIVAN & LARRY TIFFT, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: HEALING 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF OUR EVERYDAY LIVES ix (2001) (emphasis added).  
 169. See, e.g., GERRY JOHNSTONE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: IDEAS, VALUES, 
DEBATES 124 (2d ed. 2002) (“[M]any who were sympathetic towards the ideas of 
restorative justice . . . nevertheless criticized . . . victim-offender mediation for 
being too ‘private’ and for failing to involve the community . . . .”). 
 170. See, e.g., Dennis Sullivan & Larry Tifft, The Transformative and Eco-
nomic Dimensions of Restorative Justice, 22 HUMAN. & SOC’Y 38, 43 (1998) (ar-
guing that insufficient “attention is paid to social structural violence, that is, 
violence done to people through the exercise of power, and hierarchical social 
arrangements that support the maintenance of this power”); see also David 
Dyck, Reaching Toward a Structurally Responsive Training and Practice of Re-
storative Justice, 3 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 239, 239 (2000) (cataloguing (largely 
North American) critiques of restorative justice for focusing “too much on the 
interpersonal dimensions of crime while largely ignoring the deeper roots of the 
trouble as found in class, race/ethnicity, and gender-based conflict”). 
 171. Gordon Bazemore & Mara Schiff, Understanding Restorative Commu-
nity Justice: What and Why Now?, in RESTORATIVE COMMUNITY JUSTICE: RE-
PAIRING HARM AND TRANSFORMING COMMUNITIES 36 (Gordon Bazemore & 
Mara Schiff eds., 2001).  
 172. GARLAND, supra note 16, at 99–102.  
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political changes in the American penal system that make a po-
litical question about the relationship between restorative jus-
tice and “policies of deregulation and market freedom” in the 
1990s intelligible but also, as a practical-institutional matter, 
then not terribly pressing. The question is intelligible because 
restorative justice shares core ideas in common with what David 
Garland describes as three key changes in the American penal 
system that meshed with a broader retreat from public welfarist 
interventions—namely, an attack on rehabilitation; governing 
through community; and the rise of the victim (all described be-
low).173 But before the millennium the question was not terribly 
pressing because leading restorative justice proponents inter-
preted each commitment in ways that made their own work mar-
ginal—that is, without the kind of mainstream institutional leg-
ibility likely to inspire assimilation. As long as the American 
penal state advanced a law-and-order agenda—based simulta-
neously on punishment and rational economics—restorative jus-
tice remained a fringe movement without any real left or right 
political power. 
To briefly elaborate, Garland submits that from the 1970s 
onward, penal welfarism—a set of penal ideas and practices 
based on correctional concerns and professional rehabilitation—
lost its status as “the overarching ideology of the system.”174 Pe-
nal welfarism reflected a modern statist ideal: that “social prob-
lems are best managed by specialist bureaucracies that are  
directed by the state, informed by experts, and rationally  
directed towards particular tasks.”175 In the 1970s, prominent  
retributivists such as Andrew von Hirsh led an attack on social 
purpose, proposing that criminal courts instead enact only pro-
portional, uniform, equitable, desert-based sentences discon-
nected from concerns with offender “treatment.”176  
As we have seen, restorativists joined an attack on  
penal welfarism. Indeed, restorativists shared elements of  
retributivist theory, specifically how it configures offenders as 
responsible moral agents, rather than as deviant subjects in 
 
 173. For elaborations of these three (and other) transformations in American 
criminal justice administration, see id. at 8–20, 123–27. 
 174. Id. at 8. 
 175. Id. at 34. 
 176. See generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF 
PUNISHMENTS (1976).  
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need of therapeutic interventions. But they rejected a model of 
deserved punishment not only because many shunned punitive 
intent, but also because they found desert theory too general and 
impersonal. As Kathleen Daly explains, “von Hirsch wants to 
limit the [desert-based] ‘censure conveyed through punish-
ment . . . [to the] person externally,’” and not entitle the state “to 
use its coercive powers to seek to induce moral sentiments of re-
pentance.”177 Many restorativists argued exactly the opposite. 
They wanted criminal procedures to trigger personalized peni-
tential feelings.  
In the United States, neither measured retributivists advo-
cating for equitable, proportional punishments, nor restorativ-
ists advocating for personalized, dialogic forms of accountability 
succeeded in practice. Policy elites instead translated retributiv-
ist theory into “harsh justice”178 based on an image of an irre-
deemable criminal actor (“the threatening outcast, the fearsome 
stranger”) and encoded it in rules such as mandatory minimums, 
three strike laws, and the elimination of parole.179 But rules am-
plifying punishment did not exhaust the logics of criminal justice 
during this period. To the contrary, at the same time as the 
“state’s power to punish [took] on a renewed political salience 
and priority,” the state’s capacity to engage in crime control also 
came “to be viewed as limited and contingent.”180 Here the crim-
inal justice state, like many aspects of the American administra-
tive and adjudicatory state, increasingly relied on extra-state 
private controls.  
Hence, Americans also witnessed the rise of community as 
a solution to many criminal justice problems (think: community 
policing, community corrections, community crime controls).181 
In this paradigm, “community” often became a receptacle for ra-
tional choice criminology now operating “beyond the state.”182 
Theorists and policymakers described criminals as “opportun- 
istic consumer[s]”183 who break laws when benefits outweigh 
 
 177. Kathleen Daly, Revisiting the Relationship Between Retributive and Re-
storative Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: PHILOSOPHY TO PRACTICE 33, 46–
47 (Heather Strang & John Braithwaite eds., 2000).  
 178. WHITMAN, supra note 17. 
 179. GARLAND, supra note 16, at 137. 
 180. Id. at 120. 
 181. See id. at 123. 
 182. Id. at 129. 
 183. Id.  
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costs,184 and therefore they designed community controls to de-
centralize and optimize risk management through, for example, 
private surveillance, local patrols, and incentives to reward law-
abiding behavior.  
Restorative justice shared a community-oriented ethos. For 
example, Bazemore and Umbreit reasoned that the ultimate suc-
cess of restorative justice should be measured by “its ability to 
strengthen the capacity of communities to respond effectively to 
crime.”185 But restorativists did not argue for community con-
trols based on risk-management and rewards. Rather, they 
wished to narrow the social distance between offenders and vic-
tims by re-embedding them in social relations. They hoped that 
in restorative mediations educators, clergy, extended family, and 
neighbors could collectively instill within offenders pro-social be-
havior through feelings of empathy and remorse for the harms 
they committed against their particular victims.186 
To that end, restorativists also joined a larger social move-
ment in the 1980s and 1990s to prioritize the voices of victims. 
Much of this movement was driven, Markus Dirk Dubber ar-
gues, “by grassroots campaigns of concerned citizens backed by 
politicians eager to outdo their opponents in the tough-on-crime 
competition.”187 These activists and politicians often encouraged 
citizens to identify intensely with victims through individualized 
 
 184. See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Ap-
proach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). 
 185. Bazemore & Umbreit, supra note 141, at 15.  
 186. See, e.g., Anthony Bottoms, Some Sociological Reflections on Restorative 
Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING OR REC-
ONCILABLE PARADIGMS? 79, 100 (Andrew von Hirsch, Julian Roberts, Anthony 
E. Bottoms, Kent Roach & Mara Schiff eds., 2003) (“RJ has remained predomi-
nantly small-scale and communitarian . . . [with] certainly very little use of such 
late modern devices as risk assessment profiles. Neither RJ practitioners, nor 
most academics sympathetic to RJ, show any sustained interest in the issues of 
‘managerialism’ and ‘risk’ in relation to criminal justice . . . .”); Richard Young, 
Testing the Limits of Restorative Justice: The Case of Corporate Victims, in NEW 
VISIONS OF CRIME VICTIMS 133, 162–65 (Carolyn Hoyle & Richard Young eds., 
2002) (describing how restorative mediations require corporate representatives 
that are willing to express concerns with personal safety, security and loss, and 
to engage in “inclusionary” dialogue with offenders, rather than to use confer-
ences to engage in actuarial risk-management strategies); Braithwaite & Mug-
ford, supra note 31, at 144 (describing how offenders can learn to feel shame 
and remorse through connections with others). 
 187. Markus Dirk Dubber, The Victim in American Penal Law: A Systematic 
Overview, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 3, 6 (1999). 
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and spectacular representations of their suffering.188 The vic-
tims’ rights movement also coincided with a decline in social sol-
idarity expressed by faith in public institutions. As Garland ob-
serves, “in the new morality of market individualism, . . . moral 
sentiments are increasingly privatized along with everything 
else.”189 As such, he reasons, individual narratives of victim suf-
fering became especially useful to motivate moral feeling.190 Jon-
athan Simon offers a related claim. He traces how late twentieth 
century policy elites used the “victim” to replace the “worker” or 
“consumer” as the idealized American citizen in need of state 
protection.191 Both Garland and Simon thus read the rise of the 
(often white, middle-class) figure of the victim onto broader  
political transformations. In the economic sphere, this victim 
helped to justify the state’s retreat from welfarist interventions 
on behalf of workers and consumers; in the penal sphere,  
it helped to justify the state’s intensification of moral  
law-and-order statism and market-managerial crime control—
three trends that scholars read together as neoliberal criminal 
justice administration.192  
How should we understand restorative justice here? Restor-
ativists argue, after all, that crime primarily harms a victim 
(and, yes, her community as well) but not an abstract “society” 
or the state.193 And as the field advanced, restorativists worked 
intently to make their practice more victim-centered against 
criticisms that their real allegiances lay with offenders.194 Yet 
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Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581, 618–25 (2009).  
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restorativists persisted in refusing an idealized image of a venge-
ful victim mobilized by policy elites. In the restorativist imagi-
nation, if a victim is rendered insecure or even shattered, with 
support and the refuge of community, she is able to express an-
guish and anger and yet transcend vengeance, becoming open to 
personal recovery and forgiveness. For Zehr, this victim reflects 
what it means to be Christian: “seeking suffering for offenders is 
neither productive nor consistent with God’s love”195 (a point he 
would later rewrite using trauma theory196).  
At this point, two observations should be clear. First, we can 
see how restorative justice, as it coalesced in the 1990s, was con-
gruous with many of the broader neoliberal penal trends that 
coexisted with its creation: crime is personalized, justice is pri-
vatized, offenders are responsibilized, victims are centralized, 
the community is mobilized, and the state is deemphasized. 
These ideals are all rich for complex political alliances and new 
translations. Yet, we can also see why the restorative movement 
had little institutional pull in the decades preceding the millen-
nium. Restorativists insisted on a moral-dialogic offender while 
the criminal justice system envisaged a rational or pathological 
offender; restorativists insisted on a relational victim whereas 
policy elites repeatedly conjured a vengeful one; and  
restorativists invoked an inclusionary (if also vague) under-
standing of community as an entity desirous and capable of “in-
creas[ing] individual . . . commitment to the common good” 
whereas mainstream criminal justice reformers theorized com-
munity according to rational economic logics.197 Hence, for 
scholar-practitioners who hoped that restorative justice could 
advance social and distributive justice—yet worried that restor-
ative practice had become too individuated and “a-structural”—
it would not have made sense to engage in too much hand- 
 
essential to [restorative justice’s] survival.” Gordon Bazemore & Sandra 
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 196. Howard Zehr, Restoring Justice, in GOD AND THE VICTIM: THEOLOGICAL 
REFLECTIONS ON EVIL, VICTIMIZATION, JUSTICE, AND FORGIVENESS 131, 139–
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wringing. To be sure, restorative justice failed, as its left propo-
nents reflected, to generate structural change or any significant 
measure of decarceration (it would have taken a revolution to do 
otherwise). But in the law-and-order climate of the 1990s in the 
United States, restorative justice was far too marginal—perhaps 
far too ethereal—for anyone to seriously claim it was strengthen-
ing neoliberalism.  
III.  RETRIBUTIVE-RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND MORAL 
NEOLIBERALISM: 2000s TO NOW   
After the crisis of mass incarceration, I think the situation 
has changed. As Americans have come to question elements of 
penal harshness alongside the costs of mass imprisonment (and 
as crime rates have declined),198 policymakers have begun to 
pursue small programs of decarceration.199 Reformers on the po-
litical right, however, do not appeal simply to rational economic 
calculations to justify penal reform even as they advocate con-
servative fiscal policy and small government. Some also actively 
encourage restoration—albeit often as a supplement to, rather 
than a replacement for, retribution. In this Part, I trace ideas 
that contributed to this transformation. First, in the early 2000s 
among American criminal law professors who advocated for the 
integration of restorative justice and traditional penal theories 
and, in so doing, urged greater attention to the relational, not 
simply micro-economic, determinants of individual behavior and 
crime. Second, among evangelical Christian reformers whose vi-
sion of restorative justice includes the claim that theories of 
crime and reconciliation should be de-structuralized.  
I suggest that a working composite of these ideas is today 
supported by the Charles Koch Foundation, a nonprofit within 
the broader Koch network committed to advancing individual 
liberty and economic freedom and opposed to redistributive pub-
 
 198. See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DE-
CLINE (2007). 
 199. Jonathan Simon, for example, suggests that a new “consensus now ex-
ists among criminologists that states should be addressing many nonviolent, 
nonserious crimes—even many now classed as felonies—with some combination 
of fines (which can be made income neutral), restorative justice, enhanced pro-
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also notes that “2010 was the first year in the last thirty-seven in which the 
nationwide prison population decreased.” Id. at 173 n.1.  
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lic social policies. The Foundation applies “market-based man-
agement” (a registered trademark) to solve social problems, and 
now encourages penal reform as part of advancing its overarch-
ing mission.200  
To illustrate the radicalism of this vision, consider that 
Charles Koch once criticized Chicago school economist Milton 
Friedman for “merely trying to make government work more ef-
ficiently when the true libertarian should be tearing it out at the 
root.”201 Here my overarching argument is as follows: radical lib-
ertarians and proponents of market freedom today support re-
storative ideas in part because they know that a compelling case 
for shrinking the penal and social state cannot rest solely on eco-
nomic discipline. As such, restorative justice illustrates how 
moral-relational values are not invariably criticisms of—they 
can already be incorporated from within—neoliberalism. 
A. MORAL MEDIATION  
In 2003, Erik Luna (who would later establish a Koch- 
supported criminal justice center) hosted what he ventured was 
the first gathering devoted to restorative justice in “American 
legal academe.”202 Luna asked if restorative justice could be 
“more cost effective, more likely to reduce crime rates and recid-
ivism, and more humane” than standard criminal justice prac-
tice.203 But rather than promote the thick value-laden version 
associated with Zehr and his colleagues, Luna proposed a “pro-
cedural conception of restorative justice [that] would allow all 
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modern punishment theories to contribute to the decisionmak-
ing process.”204 He envisioned respectful dialogues that would 
include moral censure of the criminal act and where participants 
could collaboratively reach any agreement on sanctioning for any 
reason, provided it doesn’t contravene what Luna argued should 
be legislatively mandated floors and ceilings.205 Luna thus aimed 
to interject purposeful indeterminacy into the restorative model; 
from his perspective, restorative practices like reparations and 
forgiveness could overlap with any modern penal value.206 
In the same volume, Paul Robinson likewise proposed sepa-
rating restorative justice processes from restorative justice the-
ory. Contra Brown and Delgado, Robinson liked how restorative 
processes infuse the criminal justice system with moral- 
relational influence and bottom-up participation—values he rea-
soned that could produce “significant crime control benefits” 
through system-wide legitimation.207 But Robinson argued that 
beyond minor cases, restorative meditations should complement, 
not replace, deserved punishment for the sake of what he called 
“justice.”208 Darren Bush proposed a different marriage: he com-
mended restorative interventions for shaping moral-relational 
preferences yet thought “restorative justice ought to be combined 
with some [non-restorative] mechanisms that have deterrence 
value.”209  
These integrative theories—articulated by prominent crim-
inal law scholars who may hold a range of political positions on 
 
 204. Erik Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception 
of Restorative Justice, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 205, 288 (emphasis added). 
 205. Id. at 289–95. 
 206. Cf. John Braithwaite, Holism, Justice, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L. 
REV. 389, 391 & n.14 (“I cannot see how one can nurture restorative values like 
mercy and forgiveness while taking retributive proportionality seriously . . . . 
This is not to deny that there is a retributive conception of mercy and that there 
could be a retributive theory of forgiveness. It is just to say that mercy and for-
giveness as restorative values mean something very different from what they 
could mean under any retributive formulation.”). 
 207. Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of Restorative Processes, the Vices of “Re-
storative Justice,” 2003 UTAH L. REV. 375, 376; cf. Tom R. Tyler, Restorative Jus-
tice and Procedural Justice: Dealing with Rule Breaking, 62 J. SOC. ISSUES 307 
(2006). 
 208. Robinson, supra note 207, at 384. 
 209. Darren Bush, Law and Economics of Restorative Justice: Why Restora-
tive Justice Cannot and Should Not Be Solely About Restoration, 2003 UTAH L. 
REV. 439, 469. 
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the relationship between the market and the state, I don’t pre-
sume to speculate—accomplished two things. First, they re-
moved normative barriers to theorizing restorative justice as 
consistent with existing punishment ideologies rather than as 
an aspirational alternative to the dominant carceral paradigm, 
opening up new conceptual spaces for restorative justice to 
travel. Second, they retained for restorative justice a specific 
moral distinctiveness by promoting moral-relational values such 
as apology, remorse, and forgiveness—values that compel ethi-
cal action because they are theorized apart from rational eco-
nomics and market discipline.  
Consider, as one final example, a 2004 Yale Law Journal 
article by Stephanos Bibas (who is now a federal judge appointed 
by President Trump) and Richard Bierschbach. They criticized 
“[m]ainstream criminal law scholarship” for over-emphasizing 
“microeconomic concerns with individual behavior” while ne-
glecting “the social and relational dimensions of criminal wrong-
doing.”210 “Lawyers, schooled in law and economics,” they ar-
gued, “are taught to evaluate settlements from a rational-actor 
perspective. We add up the monetary benefits, subtract the mon-
etary costs, and arrive at a net present value . . . . But the ordi-
nary person does not evaluate crime and punishment that 
way.”211  
Bibas and Bierschbach thus called for moral dialogic pro-
cesses—specifically victim-offender mediation—to promote 
“moral education, catharsis, healing, and reconciliation.”212 
Through VOM, they reasoned, offenders could “realize the 
wrongfulness of their acts, feel sorrow for their misdeeds, and 
accept responsibility. . . . [R]emorse and apology can help offend-
ers cleanse their consciences and return to the moral fold.”213 
Likewise, victims could potentially “achieve catharsis, let go of 
their anger, and forgive.”214 Yet they argued that “[r]emorse and 
apology are not substitutes for punishment in most cases, as the 
restorative justice movement mistakenly contends.”215 “For most 
 
 210. Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and 
Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 111, 112, 148 (2004). 
 211. Id. at 147. 
 212. Id. at 148. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. at 91 (emphasis added). 
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crimes of more than minimal seriousness,” they insisted, “pun-
ishment is needed to underscore the community’s denunciation 
of the crime and vindication of the victim.”216 Hence Bibas and 
Bierschbach criticized “the academic literature” for failing to no-
tice an “intriguing fusion of mediation and punishment”217—pro-
posing to transform what was once many restorativists’ fear or 
at least a very “fraught issue”218 into a normative policy agenda. 
B. MORAL NEOLIBERALISM AND AMERICAN RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE 
Writing from a different perspective, evangelical prison re-
former Charles Colson advanced his own retributive-restorative 
fusion (that Bibas and Bierschbach could have invoked to chal-
lenge the dominant understanding of restorative justice penned 
by Zehr and Braithwaite that rejects or minimizes retribution). 
A former Nixon administration official, in 1975 Colson founded 
Prison Fellowship, a large international prison ministry,  
after experiencing a spiritual transformation while serving a  
prison sentence for Watergate-related offenses.219 Like other  
restorativists (and, in the 1970s, writing before the restorative 
justice movement coalesced), Colson attempted to humanize of-
fenders. He described the people he met in prison not as rational 
calculators but rather as men with “a sense of decency and good-
ness” yet “in the grip of some kind of evil power,”220 and he sim-
ultaneously described all of us as fellow sinners (“we all share 
with [prisoners] a common heritage of sin”).221 
 
 216. Id. at 123 n.183. 
 217. Id. at 124. 
 218. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 11, at 16. 
 219. See generally CHARLES W. COLSON, BORN AGAIN (1976). On Prison Fel-
lowship, see PRISON FELLOWSHIP, ANNUAL REPORT (2017), http:// 
prisonfellowship.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/AnnualReport_17_Nov21_ 
web.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2BV-BPXA]. In 2017, its revenues were over 39 mil-
lion. Id.  
 220. COLSON, supra note 219, at 319. For a broader genealogy of some of the 
strands of American Christianity reflected in Colson’s penal ideas, see David A. 
Green, Penal Optimism and Second Chances: The Legacies of American Protes-
tantism and the Prospects for Penal Reform, 15 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 123 
(2013). 
 221. Charles Colson, Towards an Understanding of Imprisonment and Re-
habilitation, in CRIME AND THE RESPONSIBLE COMMUNITY 151, 165–66 (John 
Stott & Nick Miller eds., 1980).  
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In the late 1980s, an arm of Prison Fellowship called Justice 
Fellowship began to develop its own explicit theory and practice 
of restorative justice.222 “It should be noted,” the organization ex-
plained, “that the term restorative justice is not unique to Justice 
Fellowship, although this formulation of the vision is.”223 Prison 
Fellowship reformers based their model on ideas that Daniel 
Van Ness elaborated in his 1986 book Crime and Its Victims224 
and that Van Ness rearticulated along with Colson in their 1989 
book Convicted.225  
Around the millennium this work intensified and began to 
institutionalize. In 1997, at the behest of then-Governor of Texas 
George W. Bush, another arm of Prison Fellowship implemented 
the first contemporary faith-based program in an American 
prison in Texas, which featured an intensive restorative curric-
ulum (offenders engaged in dialogic encounters with groups of 
victims).226 In the span of a few years, this Prison Fellowship af-
filiate opened similar programs in Kansas, Iowa, and Minne-
sota;227 Van Ness and Karen Heetderks Strong published Restor-
ing Justice, a book intended for secular audiences;228 Colson and 
his coauthors published law review articles advocating for re-
storative principles and legislation;229 Colson published Justice 
that Restores;230 and another Prison Fellowship-affiliated organ-
 
 222. DANIEL W. VAN NESS, DAVID R. CARLSON JR., THOMAS CRAWFORD & 
KAREN STRONG, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: THEORY 5 (1989) (describing, for exam-
ple, how in 1988 the board of Justice Fellowship began a three-year project to 
design a restorative justice model based on biblical principles). 
 223. Id. at 5 (second emphasis added). The authors then proceeded to write: 
“[f]or popularizing that name and for his many other generous contributions of 
time and insights, we are deeply indebted to Howard Zehr, Director of the Men-
nonite Central Committee’s U.S. Office of Criminal Justice.” Id. 
 224. DANIEL W. VAN NESS, CRIME AND ITS VICTIMS (1986).  
 225. CHARLES COLSON & DANIEL VAN NESS, CONVICTED: NEW HOPE FOR 
ENDING AMERICA’S CRIME CRISIS (1989).  
 226. Chuck Colson & Pat Nolan, Prescription for Safer Communities, 18 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 387, 394 (2004). 
 227. Id. 
 228. DANIEL VAN NESS & KAREN HEETDERKS STRONG, RESTORING JUSTICE 
(1997). 
 229. Charles W. Colson, Truth, Justice, Peace: The Foundations of Restora-
tive Justice, 10 REGENT U. L. REV. 1 (1998); Colson & Nolan, supra note 226; 
Daniel W. Van Ness & Pat Nolan, Legislating for Restorative Justice, 10 REGENT 
U. L. REV. 53 (1998). 
 230. CHARLES W. COLSON, JUSTICE THAT RESTORES (2001). 
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ization published a volume on Christian approaches to victimi-
zation.231 
Colson and his coauthors engaged with early VORP writers 
such as Zehr (and vice versa) to describe and elaborate Christian 
restorative principles. But Colson and Zehr offered crucially dif-
ferent biblical visions.232 Colson argued that restoration should 
coexist normatively with retribution, that crime should be theo-
rized apart from preexisting social-structural-environmental 
conditions, and that restorativists should seek active partner-
ships with the state, but in order to encourage social welfare pri-
vatization. Let me flesh out these distinctions. 
Retribution first. Like other early restorativists, Colson sus-
pected treatment and deterrence-based theories of punishment: 
“To justify punishment by whether it ‘deters or cures,’” Colson 
wrote, “is the triumph of sociology over justice.”233 But just de-
serts, he submitted, reflects God’s rightful authority to punish 
morally evil acts—authority, he explained, that works through 
the hands of the secular magistrate.234 As such, Winnifred Sulli-
van summarizes, “[t]he state’s failure to exact retribution is, in 
Colson’s view, the first step to ‘collapse of the entire social or-
der.’”235  
A self-described law-and-order conservative who champions 
retribution, Colson nonetheless argued that restorative justice is 
necessary to rebalance American democracy in favor of liberty.236 
 
 231. GOD AND THE VICTIM: THEOLOGICAL REFLECTIONS ON EVIL, VICTIMIZA-
TION, JUSTICE AND FORGIVENESS (Lisa Barnes Lampman & Michelle D. Shat-
tuck eds., 1999). 
 232. Some early writers noted these distinctions. For example, in 1989 the 
Mennonite Central Committee Office of Criminal Justice published a volume 
with contributions from Howard Zehr, Daniel Van Ness, and M. Kay Harris. 
Harris criticized Van Ness (but not Zehr) for an “exclusive emphasis on the in-
dividual responsibility of the offender [that] appears likely to reinforce current 
social divisions and inequities.” M. Kay Harris, Alternative Visions in the Con-
text of Contemporary Realities, in JUSTICE: THE RESTORATIVE VISION 31–32 
(1989). 
 233. WINNIFRED FALLERS SULLIVAN, PRISON RELIGION: FAITH-BASED RE-
FORM AND THE CONSTITUTION 104 (2009).  
 234. Id. at 105. 
 235. Id.  
 236. Colson, supra note 229, at 1 (“Citizens either must restrain themselves 
by an internal sense of duty or they must be restrained externally by a sense of 
fear. . . . ‘The greater the strength of duty, the greater the liberty.’”). 
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Order, he reasoned, often costs some individual freedom.237 But 
“[a] fearful public has alternatives to strong-armed intervention 
by the government to suppress disorder”—namely, citizens who 
volitionally turn away from personal preferences to objective 
moral truth and the authority of law.238 From this perspective, 
the problem with the American justice system is not just deserts 
(although Prison Fellowship writers submit that some deserts 
like mandatory minimums and carceral sentences for nonviolent 
offenders are unjustly excessive).239 The problem is rather that 
retribution lacks moralizing—indeed revelatory—force because 
it is not placed “in the context of community and always with the 
chance of transformation of the individual and the healing of 
fractured relationships and of the moral order.”240 Like the legal 
scholars described above, Colson argued that punishment and 
restoration should be fused together. 
Second, Colson pitted restorative justice against modernist 
social theories of crime—that is, against a view that holds “fault 
lies not in ourselves, but in unemployment, racism, poverty, or 
mental illness” and “the solution to crime must lie in addressing 
those outside factors.”241 “No matter what its aggravating 
causes,” Colson and Van Ness insisted, “there is only one taproot 
of crime. It is not some sociological phenomenon; it is sin.”242 
“The Bible tells us that crime is sin,” Prison Fellowship’s restor-
ative justice training manual likewise explains.243 From this per-
spective, faith conquers crime—that is, self and social order are 
restored through spiritual transformations, ministered by Chris-
tians in direct, personal, and loving relations.  
 
 237. Id. at 1–9. 
 238. Id. at 9. 
 239. See, e.g., COLSON & VAN NESS, supra note 225, at 89 (“If we really want 
to get tough on crime, let’s hold offenders accountable to their victims. Let’s 
reserve prisons for hardened criminals (where they can be incarcerated for 
longer periods of time), and let’s put nonviolent offenders to work.”); VAN NESS, 
supra note 224, at 88 (“I am not justifying the kind of punishments we inflict 
today in prison. . . . But we should not abandon the notion of punishment simply 
because there are problems with its implementation.”).  
 240. COLSON, supra note 230, at 115. 
 241. COLSON & VAN NESS, supra note 225, at 56. 
 242. Id. at 57. 
 243. SULLIVAN, supra note 233, at 95. 
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Arguments for social service privatization follow. Public in-
stitutions fail, Colson and Van Ness ventured, because “no gov-
ernmental system can . . . change the human heart.”244 Govern-
ment, they reasoned, sacralizing (a version of) libertarianism, 
has necessary functions including “the God-ordained responsi-
bility to restrain evil and to preserve public order . . . through its 
police forces, courts, and prisons.”245 But the Church “brings 
unique resources to offenders that government programs cannot 
hope to effect,” namely, love and communion.246  
The surge of faith-based restorative prison programs that 
Prison Fellowship spearheaded in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
reflected, as Melinda Cooper observes, “a much wider transfor-
mation of the social services that has seen religious providers 
actively included in government contracts to provide homeless 
shelters, soup kitchens, group homes, substance-abuse treat-
ment, welfare-to-work training, healthy marriage, and responsi-
ble fatherhood instruction, along with a whole host of other ser-
vices for the poor.”247 These transformations were, in turn, made 
possible by changes in American welfare legislation. In 1996, 
when the federal government scaled back means-tested welfare, 
it simultaneously authorized states to contract with religious or-
ganizations to provide social services “without impairing the re-
ligious character of such organizations.”248 In 2001, President 
Bush expanded opportunities for religious organizations to 
“meet[] the needs of poor Americans,” including by creating the 
White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initia-
tives.249 Lew Daly has described these initiatives as “an effort to 
hollow out the welfare state by relinquishing its public authority 
to religious groups.”250 Colson himself made a similar claim. 
“What’s at stake,” he stressed, discussing a legal challenge to 
government funding of Prison Fellowship’s prison interventions, 
“is not just a prison program, but how we deal with social prob-
 
 244. COLSON & VAN NESS, supra note 225, at 67. 
 245. Id. at 71. 
 246. Id. 
 247. COOPER, supra note 37, at 265. 
 248. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 104, 110 Stat. 2105, 2161–63 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 601–617, 619 (2012)) (“charitable choice” provision).  
 249. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 §§ 1–2 (Jan. 29, 2001). 
 250. LEW DALY, GOD AND THE WELFARE STATE 32 (2006).  
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lems in our country. Do we do it through grassroots organiza-
tions or big government? We know what works.”251  
Indeed, consider how Van Ness and Pat Nolan252 described 
a model secular restorative justice program. A juvenile court re-
cruits public and private actors and clergy to help offenders sur-
mount bad behavior: “If they were chronically absent, their tru-
ant officer was included. If they couldn’t read, local optometrists 
performed free eye exams. If they needed glasses, the local Lions 
Club donated them. If they were gang members, plastic surgeons 
volunteered to remove their tattoos.”253 In this example, basic 
forms of care—eye exams and glasses—happen voluntarily 
through the community. Voluntarism matters greatly, as Prison 
Fellowship Vice President Heather Rice-Minus explains, be-
cause it grounds the Christian case for small government: “As 
Christians, rather than spend more money through taxes so that 
the state can act as an institutional service provider, we wish to 
give in ways that build relationships.”254  
Daly argues that partnerships between the federal govern-
ment and religious organizations have helped “the religious 
groups that provide social services, not the people who depend 
 
 251. Samantha M. Shapiro, Charles Colson’s Jails for Jesus, MOTHER 
JONES, Nov./Dec. 2003, https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2003/11/jails 
-jesus-charles-colson/ [https://perma.cc/Z3XL-FVHS]; see also Tanya Erzen, Tes-
timonial Politics: The Christian Right’s Faith-Based Approach to Marriage and 
Imprisonment, 59 AM. Q. 991 (2007). On the lawsuit Colson is invoking, see gen-
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 252. Pat Nolan was a prominent California Republican who, after serving a 
prison sentence for racketeering, joined the leadership of Prison Fellowship and 
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on them.”255 But I want to read all this in good faith.256 Motivat-
ing arguments against the American welfare state and public 
provisioning are lived spiritual commitments to personal re-
demption, mutual aid, love, and relationship-building.  
As the following case illustrates, here we have a version of 
restorative justice aptly expressed as moral neoliberalism. Its 
decarceral potential is ethically appealing, drawing on values 
such as redemption and forgiveness alongside values such as ef-
ficiency and cost savings; it is likely practically desirable for any- 
one concerned with the inhumanity of today’s prisons; and it is 
used explicitly by libertarians and conservatives to break popu-
lar associations with government as a necessary and desirable 
social institution. 
C. VICTIM-OFFENDER MEDIATION IN TEXAS  
Texas, a state known for fiscally oriented libertarian penal 
reform,257 is experimenting with VOM. In 2009, Democratic 
house representative Ruth McClendon introduced a bill author-
izing courts to divert people charged with misdemeanor and 
state-jailable felony property crimes to mediation before a guilty 
plea or conviction.258 McClendon linked popular arguments 
about cost savings and docket clearing to values such as apology, 
dialogue, and reparations.259 Her Democratic colleague Jim 
McReynolds echoed her restorative aspirations: “If I transgress, 
and it’s not a major crime, and the victim and I can get to-
gether . . . and . . . I make that restitution and this person is 
willing to give forgiveness . . . couldn’t lives be redeemed and 
problems be solved shy of using stiffer penalties and ultimately 
state-run facilities?”260  
 
 255. DALY, supra note 250, at 43. 
 256. I use the term good faith as an invitation for readers to grapple with 
alternative world-making visions, not as a form of interpretation that disallows 
for complex human motivations, including the reality that people can hold views 
that are both sincere and strategic.  
 257. See McLeod, supra note 4, at 667–68. 
 258. H.B. 2139, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009). In 2007, McClendon pro-
posed a predecessor bill that died in committee. H.B. 2750, 80th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Tex. 2007). 
 259. Hearing on H.B. 2139 Before the H. Comm. on Corrections, 81st Leg. 
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2009) (testimony of Rep. Ruth McClendon). 
 260. Id. (testimony of Rep. Jim McReynolds, Chair, H. Comm. on Correc-
tions).  
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McClendon envisioned that a mediation agreement—which 
would include an apology, restitution, community service, and 
potentially counseling—would result in dismissal.261 As she con-
ceived it, however, offenders—not taxpayers—would absorb 
most or all of the costs of mediation: up to $500 for program costs, 
plus any counseling costs, based on the offender’s ability to 
pay.262 This was a crucial provision. Prosecutors could already 
divert arrested people to mediation at their discretion.263 But to 
charge offenders for the value of reconciliation, they needed stat-
utory authorization.264  
Numerous actors with different political affiliations advo-
cated for the bill over the years it was considered. For example, 
the Texas Public Policy Foundation (TPPF)—a leading Koch-
funded think tank devoted to small government and economic 
freedom—repeatedly testified in support.265 A legislative staff 
person representing an association of prosecutors described 
TPPF’s position as follows:  
For drug and property crimes, they don’t think the state should be lock-
ing those people up because it costs too much. They are interested in 
shrinking government. That’s why they support victim-offender medi-
ation. Why should we pay taxes and the court system to do something 
when people can do it themselves?266  
TPPF employee Vikrant Reddy (now a senior fellow at the 
Charles Koch Institute, a Charles Koch Foundation-affiliated or-
ganization) added nuance to this position. In legislative testi-
mony, Reddy emphasized the value of empathy. In VOM, he ex-
plained, 
an offender realizes what they’ve done wrong. They begin to develop a 
certain sense of empathy, and it stops feeling so indirect. . . . It’s much 
easier to steal from Wal-Mart than it is to steal from a nursing home 
 
 261. H.B. 2139, art. 56.22–.23, .25. 
 262. Id. art. 56.25. 
 263. See, e.g., Hearing on H.B. 2019 Before the H. Comm. on Criminal Juris-
prudence, 82d Leg. Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2011) (testimony of Shannon Edmunds, 
Staff Attorney, Texas District and County Attorney’s Association). 
 264. Id. 
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sonal responsibility, and free enterprise in Texas and the nation.” Mission, TEX. 
PUB. POL’Y FOUND., https://www.texaspolicy.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/UG86 
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Consider Restorative Justice Policies, 20 CONTEMP. JUST. REV. 255, 265 (2017). 
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room because Wal-Mart seems so remote . . . and you sort of figure, 
‘what’s the harm?’ Whenever you sit down with the person that you 
stole from, the person that you victimized, you tend to feel that empa-
thy and I think the statistics show that there is that a lot more satis-
faction [from the victim].267 
Reddy thus envisioned mediations based not on rational cal-
culations and arm’s-length relations that would likely capture 
how a consumer (or rather shoplifter) feels about one of the 
world’s largest corporations, but rather on fellow-feeling: the 
kind of affective, personal remorse that one is expected to feel 
after harming an intimate caregiver. To be sure, Reddy linked 
empathy to “significant savings.”268 Because VOM influences of-
fenders and satisfies victims, he predicted the state could save 
judicial and prosecutorial resources.269 “And fundamentally,” he 
concluded, “[VOM] is a real tangible way of limiting the scope of 
government.”270 In Reddy’s comments, the moral neoliberal and 
the market neoliberal thus converge; he yoked empathy and re-
lationality to limited government and market freedom.  
Despite support from conservative and progressive organi-
zations, McClendon’s bill stalled because of state resistance: 
prosecutors demanded to decide who is eligible for mediation and 
the right to request a dismissal—demands that McClendon ex-
pressed willingness to accommodate.271 In 2015, Mark Keough, 
a newly elected Republican legislator, jointly authored McClen-
don’s revised bill.272 Support for restorative justice is an increas-
ingly comfortable Republican position. For example, in 2012 the 
Republican Party endorsed faith-based institutions specifically 
for “[t]heir emphasis on restorative justice, to make the victim 
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whole and put the offender on the right path.”273 For his part, 
Keough lauded VOM for its roots in the Bible. “It’s really pretty 
amazing,” he exclaimed, describing how VOM has been reported 
to enhance offenders’ willingness to pay restitution.274 “And 
what’s more amazing is that the people who came up with this 
came up with it from an Old Testament scripture in the book of 
Leviticus.”275 Here is Keough’s exegetical interpretation: “pun-
ishment should be commensurate with the crime. And cutting off 
somebody’s hand [for theft] is too harsh. However, making them 
pay back four times or five times based upon the value is also 
fairly painful. Painful enough that people won’t continue with 
that form of activity.”276 From this perspective, restitution is re-
tributive (and deterrent), a position that reflects some of Colson’s 
teachings.277 
McClendon and Keough’s joint bill passed both houses in the 
Republican-controlled Texas State Legislature.278 The governor, 
however, vetoed it as an assault on state power.279 In his words, 
“‘victim-offender mediation’ leaves out a key party in criminal 
litigation—the State of Texas” (an apt reminder that on the po-
litical right, libertarian, Christian, and law-and-order positions 
continue to tangle into complex configurations).280 In 2017, 
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retributive.” COLSON & VAN NESS, supra note 225, at 50. Van Ness’s own ac-
count appears more ambivalent. He reasons: “It is certainly possible to create a 
criminal justice system built on restitution and requiring multiple amounts for 
purposes of punishment. But the more satisfying explanation to me for the use 
of different amounts in Scripture is that the fundamental requirement was sim-
ple restitution, an eye for an eye.” VAN NESS, supra note 224, at 211.  
 278. 84(R) History for H.B. 3184, Tᴇx. LEGISLATURE ONLINE, https://capitol 
.texas.gov/billlookup/History.aspx?LegSess=84R&Bill=HB3184 [https://perma 
.cc/H9JL-KACB].  
 279. GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF TEX., PROCLAMATION, H.B. 84-3184, Reg. 
Sess. (2015), https://lrl.texas.gov/scanned/vetoes/84/hb3184.pdf#navpanes=0  
[https://perma.cc/H4XU-Q7QX]. 
 280. Id.  
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Keough tried again, limiting the bill to misdemeanor property 
crimes to make it more palatable.281 Keough’s bill is currently 
pending.282 This example nonetheless illustrates a range of 
themes emergent in restorative justice’s translations: the fusion 
of restoration and punishment theories to make restorative jus-
tice less radical, its active support by libertarian reformers en-
gaged in a broader assault on social welfare spending and (par-
ticular kinds of) state power, and the idea supported—here, by 
everyone—that individual offenders rather than “society” should 
bear the costs of restoration.283  
Read more generally, this case also exemplifies how neolib-
eral penal reform rests on more than economic logics. Market-
oriented discipline is alone too anemic to carry the case for 
shrinking the penal state; American cultural sensibilities 
around personal security and irredeemable offenders mean tax-
payers are willing to pay. As the director of criminal justice pro-
grams at the Charles Koch Institute told me, “arguments about 
cost savings and fiscal prudence can start a conversation, but 
they don’t bring people over the finish line. Moral arguments 
matter.”284 Thus when organizations like TPPF and the Charles 
Koch Foundation deploy empathy and care in the service of 
shrinking government, they intend for these moral-relational 
values to be experienced noninstrumentally.  
In 2016, the Charles Koch Foundation began funding Prison 
Fellowship, continuing a strategic (and, as some have observed, 
 
 281. H.B. 72, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017). In 2016, McClendon resigned 
from the House due to illness. Patrick Svitek, Former State Rep. Ruth Jones 
McClendon Dies at 74, THE TEX. TRIB. (Dec. 19, 2017), https://www 
.texastribune.org/2017/12/19/ruth-jones-mcclendon-former-state-rep-dies/ 
[https://perma.cc/H6SW-Z3XQ]. 
 282. 85(R) History for HB 72, TEX. LEGISLATURE ONLINE, https://capitol 
.texas.gov/BillLookup/History.aspx?LegSess=85R&Bill=HB72 [https://perma 
.cc/FW88-9F75] (last visited Nov. 16, 2019). 
 283. Indeed in 2013, Republican Senator Charles Schwertner, who boasts 
that he is working “to pass one of the most conservative legislative agendas in 
Texas history,” successfully amended the state’s civil mediation statute to facil-
itate criminal mediation for nonviolent, non-sex-related offenses including by 
authorizing a user fee of up to $350. S.B. 1237, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess., 2013 Tex. 
Gen. Laws 1993; Senator Charles Schwertner, TEX. SENATE, https://senate 
.texas.gov/member.php?d=5 [https://perma.cc/4W6P-NEB9].  
 284. Interview by Amy J. Cohen with Charles Koch Foundation and Insti-
tute staff, in Arlington, Va. (Apr. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Koch Interview]. 
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uneasy) alliance with the religious right.285 Foundation staff ex-
plained that they view evangelical Christians (people who ex-
press deep faith in personal transformation) as crucial allies in 
their broader criminal justice mission—here explicitly knitting 
together the economic and the moral into the same overarching 
vision.286 To be sure, the Charles Koch Foundation, a savvy and 
powerful organization, may deploy whatever strategies and alli-
ances it calculates will advance its larger political mission.287 
But I think to leave the point here stands to miss a deeper un-
derstanding of some of the lived experiences of American neolib-
eralism. Today no one is seeking to revive restorative justice as 
a form of market freedom as it was once sketched by Randy Bar-
nett.288 To persuade citizens that they are better off with “less 
state,” libertarian and conservative reformers attempt to culti-
vate within Americans particular moral-relational sentiments, 
such as belief in grace and mutual aid. One Koch staff member, 
who had formerly worked for Prison Fellowship, described how 
in a restorative mediation a victim offered to help his own young 
offender find employment.289 His colleagues agreed that this vic-
tim-initiated overture was an exemplary restorative aspira-
tion.290 Here, then, reformers committed to radical forms of mar-
ket freedom commend restorative justice for how it nurtures 
altruistic, loving citizens. 
  CONCLUSION: RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND THE LEFT   
At the outset of this Article, I suggested that left legal schol-
ars have argued that there is a fundamental distinction between 
decarceral programs motivated by humanitarian ideals, on the 
one hand, and decarceral programs motivated primarily to cut 
 
 285. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, RETURN OF PRIVATE FOUNDATION: 
CHARLES KOCH FOUNDATION (Nov. 2017), http://990s.foundationcenter.org/ 
990pf_pdf_archive/480/480918408/480918408_201612_990PF.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/LA8W-XZHC]. On the alliance, see, for example, Paul Blumenthal, 
Koch Brothers Fund Group that Contradicts Their Ideology in 2014 Election 
Push, HUFFPOST (Oct. 23, 2014), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/koch-brothers 
-gay-marriage_n_6035958 [https://perma.cc/4B2B-67VU].  
 286. Koch Interview, supra note 284. 
 287. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, New Koch, NEW YORKER (Jan. 17, 2016), https:// 
www.newyorker.com/magazine/2016/01/25/new-koch [https://perma.cc/SK3F 
-Q5CU]. 
 288. See supra notes 97–103 and accompanying text. 
 289. Koch Interview, supra note 284. 
 290. Id. 
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costs, enhance efficiency, and shrink government, on the other. 
From this analytical perspective, which I shorthanded as market 
neoliberalism, the decarceral left criticizes the decarceral right 
for reproducing market rationalities and argues that economic 
discipline is both a morally impoverished and practically limited 
justification to ground reform of the American penal system. I 
think these arguments are significant. But I also suspect that 
they reflect a common intuition: namely, that actors on the left 
and right presume that value divergence is a defining distinc-
tion.  
Restorative justice focuses left analysts on a different prob-
lem—namely, that of value convergence, specifically as terms 
like “community,” “empathy,” and “care” travel across partisan 
lines. For this reason, I suggested that when left scholars set 
moral values against putatively amoral rational economics, they 
stand to misapprehend how real-world actors define their own 
interventions in the contemporary moment. For some libertarian 
and conservative advocates of decarceration, shrinking public so-
cial services is a deeply held commitment to promoting the well-
being of humans. Likewise, libertarian and conservative advo-
cates may describe embracing VOM to limit the social and 
political functions of government and to enhance market free-
dom—but through the conservation of ethical relations.  
From this analytical perspective, which I called moral neo- 
liberalism, the challenges of bipartisan collaborations are differ-
ent. All sides may advocate genuinely for empathy as a principle 
to order the relationships among people affected by crime, at the 
same time as all sides may disagree about what empathy re-
quires from just political, penal, and economic systems. Of 
course, this argument does not mean that left criminal justice 
reformers must therefore reject projects like VOM because they 
are politically indeterminate, as I have illustrated, today in prac-
tice—not simply in theory. (To return to Texas, local branches of 
the NAACP and the ACLU registered support for VOM legisla-
tion, motivated, I presume, to reduce the human costs of incar-
ceration.291) But it does mean that left criminal justice reformers 
 
 291. Hearing on H.B. 167 Before the H. Comm. on Criminal Jurisprudence, 
83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013); cf. JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN 
229–31 (2017) (describing the benefits, as well as the costs, of finding small 
points of convergence across ideological difference as a strategy to undo mass 
incarceration).  
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will find themselves in spaces where they are not the only ones 
advancing moral-relational commitments—all sides may invoke 
care, empathy, and mutual aid to deepen their own competing 
political and moral world-making visions. Value convergence, I 
am thus proposing, can be a risky approach to forging alliances 
across political difference.  
To be sure, this caution applies primarily to restorative jus-
tice collaborations unfolding within state systems. I do not in-
tend to suggest either that moral restorative logics exhaust left 
analytics in a struggle against mass incarceration, or that the 
left is a coherent or singular thing. For example, the work of 
Democratic legislators in Texas is not the same as social move-
ment organizers who today also turn to restorative justice, but 
from very different social locations in their struggles against 
mass incarceration.  
Let me therefore conclude with a sketch of new (and old) 
radical left approaches to restorative justice. Today, social move-
ment organizers aim to create spaces for healing and restoration 
outside of the state by experimenting in their own neighborhoods 
and communities, as they simultaneously organize to hold the 
state accountable for the harms it has perpetrated against peo-
ple of color and others through decades of violent punitive mech-
anisms. More specifically, prison-abolitionist-anti-violence femi-
nists and collectives of women of color describe efforts to 
document, concretize, and share strategies that marginalized 
communities have long deployed to manage conflict not least be-
cause they simply deem it unsafe to call upon law enforce-
ment.292 These organizers encourage dialogic responses to inti-
mate and family violence (including child sexual assault) 
through informal interventions where communities “unite[] in 
holding perpetrators accountable.”293 In so doing, they aim to re-
claim precisely the kinds of intimate, gendered, and sexual 
 
 292. See generally Ejeris Dixon, Building Community Safety: Practical Steps 
Toward Liberatory Transformation, in WHO DO YOU SERVE, WHO DO YOU PRO-
TECT? 161 (Maya Schenwar, Joe Macaré & Alan Yu-lan Price eds., 2016); Rachel 
Herzing & Isaac Ontiveros, Making Our Stories Matter: The Storytelling & Or-
ganizing Project (STOP), in THE REVOLUTION STARTS AT HOME: CONFRONTING 
INTIMATE VIOLENCE WITHIN ACTIVIST COMMUNITIES 207 (Ching-In Chen, J. 
Dulani & L. L. Piepzna-Samarasinha eds., 1st ed. 2011).  
 293. Andrea Smith, Preface to THE REVOLUTION STARTS AT HOME, supra 
note 292, at xvi. Organizers, to be sure, frequently describe the challenges of 
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harms that have legitimated punitive state interventions within 
many contemporary strands of liberal legalism and feminism—
and hence precisely the kinds of harms that many first genera-
tion restorativists conceded to formal adjudicatory power.294 Via 
highly detailed training manuals and practical curriculums, 
these radical organizers explore how community members can 
instill accountability within offenders through facilitated con-
versations that emphasize empathic listening, relationship 
building, and extensive forms of moral, material, and spiritual 
reparations. And they likewise consider how the justice provided 
by the state may diverge from victims’ own contextual and con-
tingent visions of what counts as meaningful remediation.295  
These organizers, however, tend not to describe their activ-
ism as “restorative justice,” conscious of its complex politics and 
contemporary alliances. For example, in a report describing  
community-based possibilities to address childhood sexual as-
sault, a group called Generation Five explains:  
 
community building: “developing community-based responses to violence can-
not rely on a romanticized notion of ‘community’ that is not sexist, homophobic, 
or otherwise problematic. We cannot assume that there is even an intact com-
munity to begin with. Our political task then becomes to create communities of 
accountability.” Id. 
 294. And the kinds of harms that many feminists argue continue to demand 
state-based, carceral, law-and-order responses. On resistance to restorative jus-
tice among anti-violence feminists today, see LEIGH GOODMARK, DECRIMINAL-
IZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A BALANCED POLICY APPROACH TO INTIMATE PART-
NER VIOLENCE 92–94 (2018). For analysis of different feminist positions, see 
Mimi E. Kim, From Carceral Feminism to Transformative Justice: Women-of-
Color Feminism and Alternatives to Incarceration, 27 J. ETHNIC & CULTURAL 
DIVERSITY IN SOC. WORK 219, 225–28 (2018).  
 295. See generally CREATIVE INTERVENTIONS, CREATIVE INTERVENTIONS 
TOOLKIT: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO STOP INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE (2012), 
http://www.creative-interventions.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/CI-Toolkit 
-Complete-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/SG9X-GVPA]; GENERATION FIVE, TO-
WARD TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE: A LIBERATORY APPROACH TO CHILD SEXUAL 
ABUSE AND OTHER FORMS OF INTIMATE AND COMMUNITY VIOLENCE (2007), 
http://www.generationfive.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/G5_Toward_ 
Transformative_Justice-Document.pdf [https://perma.cc/W9DA-WVCM]; THE 
CRITICAL RESISTANCE - INCITE! STATEMENT ON GENDER VIOLENCE AND THE 
PRISON-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (2008), https://incite-national.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2018/08/CR-INCITE-statement-2008discussion.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
4Z9E-MD65]. For work describing some of these interventions, see Alisa Bier-
ria, Mimi E. Kim & Clarissa Rojas, Community Accountability: Emerging Move-
ments to Transform Violence, 37 SOC. JUST. 1, no. 4, 2011–12; Leigh Goodmark, 
Should Domestic Violence Be Decriminalized?, 40 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 53, 98–
101 (2017); and Kim, supra note 294, at 226–27. 
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Our investigation began with a conversation about Restorative Justice 
because this was the framework with which we were most familiar. 
While this approach offered us a valuable starting point, we quickly 
rejected Restorative Justice models because of their co-optation by the 
State . . . . We also questioned the implication that a sense of justice 
had been present in the past that it was possible to restore. We then 
spent two years studying existing alternative models of justice—such 
as Hollow Waters (a model by First Nations people in Canada),296 IN-
CITE,297 the Mennonite Circles of Support and Accountability,298 Nav-
ajo Peacemaking processes,299 as well as Cuba’s neighborhood Commit-
tees for the Defense of the Revolution.300 
These organizers thus invoke different genealogies to de-
scribe their restorative practices and to distinguish them from 
competing institutionalized approaches. To that end, they also 
frequently use different terms such as “transformative justice”301 
 
 296. In 1984, the Hollow Water First Nation created an extensive commu-
nity-based response to the extremely high rates of sexual and family violence 
plaguing community members. For an overview of the Hollow Water model, see 
THÉRÈSE LAJEUNESSE, COMMUNITY HOLISTIC CIRCLE HEALING: HOLLOW WA-
TER FIRST NATION (1993) and RUPERT ROSS, RETURNING TO THE TEACHINGS: 
EXPLORING ABORIGINAL JUSTICE 29–48 (1996).  
 297. INCITE! is “a national activist organization of radical feminists of color 
advancing a movement to end all forms of violence against women, gender non-
conforming, and trans people of color through direct action, critical dialogue, 
and grassroots organizing.” Back cover to THE REVOLUTION WILL NOT BE 
FUNDED: BEYOND THE NON-PROFIT INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX (INCITE! ed., Duke 
Univ. Press 2017) (2007); see also COLOR OF VIOLENCE: THE INCITE! ANTHOL-
OGY (INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence ed., 2006).  
 298. These circles originated in the 1990s in Canada as (initially Mennonite-
affiliated) support groups to help reintegrate high-risk sex offenders into com-
munities. See, e.g., Robin J. Wilson, Franca Cortoni & Andrew J. McWhinnie, 
Circles of Support & Accountability: A Canadian National Replication of Out-
come Findings, 21 SEXUAL ABUSE 412 (2009).  
 299. See supra note 144. 
 300. GENERATION FIVE, supra note 295, at 4. 
 301. In the North American context, Ruth Morris, a Canadian prison aboli-
tionist, is often credited with popularizing transformative justice. See MORRIS, 
supra note 145, at 3–5. Like other left restorativists, in the 1990s, Morris began 
to argue that restorative justice “leaves out . . . the social causes of all events” 
and doesn’t sufficiently grapple with “distributive injustice.” Id. at 4–5. She ad-
vocated for transformative justice instead. Id.; RUTH MORRIS, A PRACTICAL 
PATH TO TRANSFORMATIVE JUSTICE (1994); Ruth Morris, Not Enough!, 12 ME-
DIATION Q. 285 (1995). For Zehr’s own early call for restorative justice that is 
transformative, see supra note 136. See also M. Kay Harris, Transformative 
Justice: The Transformation of Restorative Justice, in HANDBOOK OF RESTORA-
TIVE JUSTICE, supra note 54, at 555–65. 
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or “community accountability.”302 But they draw nonetheless on 
many of the same restorative ideals that animated early left 
community mediation proponents and VORP advocates: that 
much crime is interpersonal violence not an offence against the 
state; that interpersonal and structural violence are fundamen-
tally intertwined; that healing interpersonal relationships must 
therefore include efforts to transform preexisting unjust social 
conditions; that political battles for racial and economic justice 
and political battles for restorative justice therefore advance 
overlapping visions; that community and social responsibility 
must therefore accompany personal responsibility but that per-
sonal responsibility is nonetheless crucial; and that personal re-
sponsibility should evolve through processes of restoration, not 
retribution—and here with minimal or aspirationally no state 
involvement or coercion.  
This is informalism, delegalization, and decentralization 
(and to an extent it is mediation) cast once again as  
left-structural visionary politics. Organizers conjure alterative 
community-based social orders as responses to racial, economic,  
and social hierarchies. In so doing, they are revitalizing perhaps 
the most radical and practical aims plausible to ascribe to left 
restorative justice today. Namely, that while organizers wage 
political battles against the state for racial and economic justice 
and procedural reform, they can simultaneously create spaces 
for people to opt out—that is, to manage conflict and violence by 
cultivating love and forgiveness as well as armistice, separation, 
and safety through relationships and forms of reparations mean-
ingful to them. 
 
 302. Community accountability is:  
[A]ny strategy to address violence, abuse or harm that creates safety, 
justice, reparations, and healing, without relying on police, prisons, 
childhood protective services, or any other state systems. Instead of 
police and prisons, community accountability strategies depend on 
something both potentially more accessible and more complicated: the 
communities surrounding the person who was harmed and the person 
who caused harm. 
Ching-In Chen, Jai Dulani & Leah Lakshmi Piepzna-Samarasinha, Introduc-
tion to THE REVOLUTION STARTS AT HOME, supra note 292, at xxiii; see also 
Bierria, Kim & Rojas, supra note 295 (collection of articles on community ac-
countability projects); Community Accountability: Creating a Knowledge Base, 
CMTY. ACCOUNTABILITY BLOG (May 26, 2012), https:// 
communityaccountability.wordpress.com/ [https://perma.cc/N4JJ-WQY9]. 
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This final example illustrates how even as virtually all re-
storativists emphasize community, relationality, and empathy 
as definitional values, these values are simply not flexible 
enough to stake a political consensus. This is because many or-
ganizers and others directly affected by the criminal justice sys-
tem experience “community” and “relationality”—as strategies 
and values of conflict resolution—as deeply constituted by struc-
tural inequalities and generations of racial violence. Hence what 
these left restorativists want is a fundamental transformation of 
unequal systems.  
For many, this desire means a commitment to the state as a 
crucial vehicle of social change. As Angela Davis argues, “a jus-
tice system based on reparation and reconciliation” requires 
“radical transformations . . . of structures of domination,” in-
cluding, she suggests, through dramatically reimagining public 
education and free healthcare systems303—which, to note the ob-
vious, is hardly the public social vision endorsed by the Charles 
Koch Foundation. Braithwaite likewise describes a welfare state 
as a minimum political condition to sustain successful restora-
tive justice interventions.304 
At the same time, scholars on the left have also traced how 
actually existing restorative systems follow from egalitarian so-
cial and economic conditions that may emerge through voluntary 
forms of social organization as much as through centralized state 
systems. This is what David Graeber, in work on indigenous 
American penal systems, calls “‘baseline’ communism” such as 
the sharing of food and shelter so that individual autonomy and 
nonsubordination are mutually guaranteed, and property ar-
rangements where there are few opportunities to convert in- 
equalities of wealth into power over others and hence limited in-
centives to pursue material self-interest and behave badly.305 Or 
what Christie, based on sketches of European small-scale collec-
tivities, describes as including social interdependence where no 
social group holds a monopoly on power, and where group mem-
bers share specific values such as “each human body contains a 
 
 303. ANGELA DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? 107–08 (2003).  
 304. John Braithwaite, The New Regulatory State and the Transformation 
of Criminology, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 222, 233 (2000). 
 305. David Graeber, The Rat’s Wisdom 15–16 (chapter in unpublished man-
uscript) (on file with author).  
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sacred soul.”306 Or what Garland, invoking the work of Mary 
Douglas, identifies as “extensive network[s] of insurance and 
gift-giving” where mutual trust and economic security means 
“restitution can reasonably be expected and relied upon.”307 
From these perspectives, restorative justice can unfold through 
multiple forms of social ordering that may mix voluntary ex-
change and community control with state interventions.308  
This genealogy of American restorative justice has thus ar-
gued not that questions of criminal justice reform are intrinsi-
cally moral-relational issues invariably expressed as sentiments 
such as remorse, empathy, accountability, and forgiveness. Ra-
ther, it has attempted to show how significant questions of pol-
icy, politics, and institutional design are now articulated in a 
moral language—with highly contingent and divergent political 
ambitions and effects. Today, the financial and human costs of 
mass incarceration have produced renewed interest in restora-
tive justice among a wide range of activists, reformers, and schol-
ars.309 This interest, I have argued, includes a common left/right 
grammar of relationality. But rather than suggest that value 
convergence should therefore create new opportunities and gen-
erative alliances, I have explored instead how shared moral val-
ues can reflect deeply unshared political visions—a perspective 
that critical legal scholars elide when we presuppose thoroughly 
rational, atomized, individualized, and “market-based” under-
standings of neoliberalism. 
 
 
 306. NILS CHRISTIE, LIMITS TO PAIN 81–91 (1981); S. COHEN, supra note 77, 
at 229.  
 307. GARLAND, supra note 16, at 47. 
 308. See generally BRAITHWAITE, supra note 11; cf. Michael C. Dorf & 
Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. 
REV. 267 (1998).  
 309. Including, I should add, among American ADR scholars. For example, 
in 2018, Jennifer Reynolds started a listserv for law professors interested in 
criminal-side ADR. In 2019, Andrea Kupfer Schneider and Cynthia Alkon pub-
lished a textbook for law students devoted to “negotiating crime.” CYNTHIA 
ALKON & ANDREA KUPFER SCHNEIDER, NEGOTIATING CRIME: PLEA BARGAIN-
ING, PROBLEM SOLVING, AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT 
(2019).  
